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ABSTRACT
In this research, I develop an analytical framework that incorporates
two components: macroeconomic and microeconomic evaluation. I adopt a
case-study approach using the olive oil industry to evaluate obstacles to
the West Bank economic development under conditions of occupation. The
West Bank suffers from a lack of planning and coordination. Therefore,
I identify a general development framework against which proposed plans
are evaluated. In order to establish constructive development efforts, I
identify a general view of the economy's needs and goals. The case-
study is evaluated on the basis of whether or not it serves to realize the
general development goals. Different aspects are considered including the
role of the project in enhancing economic independence, generating
surplus, and providing employment opportunities. Subsequently, I carry
out a microeconomic study. The aim of the study is to explore the
obstacles facing the development of the industry, as well as the prospects
of eliminating these obstacles.
Through the case study approach I explore larger obstacles to
economic development in the framework of overall macroeconomic condition.
I choose this industry because it plays an important role in income
generation in the West Bank, in addition to providing an example of
exportable goods. As an agro-industry, its importance arises through
the significant role of land in the Palestinian political struggle where
agriculture is important in terms of both maintaining and strengthening
the Palestinians' attachment to their land. In addition, the well
established agricultural sector provides a good opportunity for the
development of the industrial sector in processing agricultural products.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Lance Taylor
Title: Professor of Economics and Urban Studies
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INTRODUCTION
The West Bank has been undergoing dramatic political, economic, and
demographic changes for the last four decades. The establishment of the
State of Israel subsequent to the 1948 war on the largest and most
developed part of Palestine, left the Palestinian economy severely
handicapped. The war cut the region off its major commercial and
industrial centers, which constituted the main market for its agricultural
output. It also lost access to the Mediterranean ports. Furthermore, the
West Bank had to accommodate about 320,000 of the Palestinian refugees
who moved to the West Bank from the conquered part of the land of
Palestine. The following merger of the West Bank with Jordan expedited
the eastward flow of labor, capital, and technology, pulled by greater
economic rewards and intervention by the Jordanian government.
Nevertheless, infrastructure and industry, and to a lesser extent
agriculture, improved although somewhat more slowly than in the East
Bank (Abed, 1981, p. 3).
The 1967 war and the conquest of Israel of the remaining areas of
Palestine brought the West Bank and Gaza Strip under the Israeli control.
The occupation authorities immediately moved to seal their control over
the area's resources, most critically land and water, and to institute a
myriad of regulations, via military orders, governing every significant
aspect of the social, economic, and political life of the Palestinian
population. Despite the Palestinian efforts to counteract the occupations
policies of dispossession and pauperization, the occupation has succeeded
In transforming the West Bank into a state of severe dependency.
In this study, I analyze prospects of development under conditions of
occupation. By adopting a case-study approach, I attempt to explore
hindrances to economic development in the framework of overall
macroeconomic condition. I analyze the case of olive oil industry
development in the West Bank. The choice of this industry stems from
three main reasons. First, it is an old and established industry. Olive
groves represent the biggest and most important agricultural activity in
the West Bank. Accordingly, olive-oil production plays an important role
in income generation in the West Bank. Second, olive oil is an
exportable good. Therefore, it provides a case for both locally consumed
and exported goods. Finally, the importance of olive oil production as an
agro-industry arises in two main areas. First, the significance of land in
the Palestinian political struggle renders agriculture important in terms of
both maintaining and strengthening the Palestinians' attachment to their
land. Second, the relatively better established agricultural sector defines
agricultural mechanization desired for the development of the industrial
sector.
In this research, I develop a method of analysis comprised of two
components; macroeconomic and microeconomic evaluation. The West Bank
suffers from a lack of planning and coordination. Therefore, it is
necessary to identify a general development framework against which
proposed plans should be evaluated. That is, in order to establish
constructive development efforts, a general view of the economy's needs
and goals should be identified. Subsequently, the proposed project
should be evaluated on the bases of whether or not it serves to realize
the general development goals. Different aspects must be considered
including the role of the project in enhancing economic independence,
generating surplus, and providing employment opportunities.
Subsequently, a microeconomic study should be carried out. The aim of
the study is to explore the obstacles facing the development of the
industry, in addition to the prospect for eliminating these obstacles.
This would be accompanied by an overall feasibility study taking into
consideration the opportunity costs associated with such a project.
In the first chapter, I identify a general development strategy for the
West Bank. Through an analysis of a number of macroeconomic
indicators, I argue that the West Bank does not only suffer from under-
development but also is in a state of severe dependency on the Israeli
economy. Under the compound effects of underdevelopment, dependency,
and attempts of uprooting the Palestinian population, I introduce general
objectives that are to be targeted by any proposed development plan. In
facing the economic challenges, the West Bank has also to maintain
national political goals in perspective. I therefore conclude that any
development policy should mainly aim at curtailing economic links with
Israel. Due to the small size of the local market, withdrawal from trade
with Israel should be accompanied by an expansion in relationships with
the world market.
In the second chapter, I analyze the olive oil industry case study. I
explore problems facing the development of this industry in its three
stages; that is, olive cultivation, pressing, and marketing. I attempt to
identify general problems and obstacles facing the development of this
industry. Through an analysis of the production process, I explore
areas where improvements could be possible. While some of the problems
discussed might be specific to the case study, most of the problems could
be generalized to include the agricultural sector.
In the third chapter, I summarize problems of economic development in
the West Bank as seen in the context of the olive oil industry, putting
forth general recommendations. In the last section, I introduce the idea
of agricultural co-operatives, as an alternative for a local national
institutional framework, that undertakes the development and planning of
the olive oil industry in specific, and the agricultural sector in general.
CHAPTER ONE
UNDER-DEVELOPMENT AND DEPENDENCY: THE WEST BANK ECONOMY
The main objective of this chapter is to outline a conceptual framework
that would facilitate the understanding of the economic development
process in the West Bank. Although this framework draws to a great
extent on the dependency literature, I use it to formulate policy
recommendations to incorporate the specifies of the West Bank case.
Dependency theorists build on the analyses of three elements (Gilpin,
1987, pp. 283-287); (1) the nature and dynamics of the capitalist world
system, (2) the relationship between the advanced and the less developed
countries, and (3) the internal characteristics of the dependent countries.
They usually adopt the Marxist critique of capitalism as defined by Lenin.
The contradictions existing in a capitalist economy force capitalism to
expand into the less-developed periphery of the world economy. This
leads to a hierarchical structure of domination between the industrial core
and the dependent periphery of the world capitalist economy.
Nevertheless, dependency theorists reject the classical Marxist view that
imperialism develops the colonized economy to a point at which it can get
rid of its bond; they argues that even if development does take place, an
economy cannot escape its shackles as long as it is dependent. Both the
underdevelopment of Third World countries and capitalist development are
the product of the expansion of international capitalism. The
international balance of economic and political power continues to be
distorted in favor of the developed economies.
In analyzing the mechanisms through which unequal development
occurs, dependency theorists define a dependent country as one whose
development is conditioned by the development and expansion of another
country. "Dependent counties are classically those whose histories of
involvement with the international market have led them to specialize in
the export of a few primary products. While the income from these few
products is absolutely central to the process of accumulation in the
dependent country, for the center each product represents only a tiny
fraction of total imports, and can usually be obtained from several
different sources" (Evans, 1979, p. 26). Within the dependency
literature, the "exploitation" theory maintains that underdevelopment of
the Third World is functionally related to the development of the center,
where the advancement of the core drains the periphery of its economic
surplus, transferring wealth from the less-developed to the developed
countries through mechanisms of trade and investment. Another view of
"dependent development" argues that high growth rates in less developed
countries do not indicate true development because they do not lead to
national economic independence (Gilpin, 1987, pp. 284-285).
Dependency theorists relate these external effects to an internal
transformation of the dependent country itself. They assert that the
dependent country is fastened to the world economy by a transnational
class linkage. An alliance occurs between the centers of international
capitalism and the clientele class that facilitates the perpetuation of a
dependent economy. Dependency theorists argue that the elites in the
periphery resist the loss of their privileges and are kept in power by the
forces of the world capitalism. Accordingly, the dependency school
advocates that the solution to underdevelopment lies in the destruction of
the linkages between international capitalism and the domestic economy
through a national leadership dedicated to autonomous development.
While the dependency school emphasizes self-reliance as the only means
for achieving national economic development, I choose policies that are
somewhat less rigid. As I emphasize the importance of the withdrawal
from economic relations with Israel, I maintain that the West Bank should
expand in its relationships with the international market, because it is a
small economy. Nevertheless, this is on the condition that emphasis is
exerted on maintaining appropriate terms of trade in the international
market. Accordingly, in the next section, I will discuss the case of the
West Bank as a specific case of dependency on the Israeli economy. I
will then propose a general framework of policies that would serve as a
first step towards independent development.
A DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
Although the West Bank economy suffers as many other developing
countries from the disadvantages of unequal exchange and center-
periphery relations, the case for the West Bank could be considered
special. It is a case of an economy subject to the compound effect of (1)
occupation of land by force and (2) the characteristics of White
Colonialism, including the dispossession of land and the transformation of
the native population to a cheap labor pool that serves the colonialist's
economy. How should a specialist approach the question of economic
development under conditions of dispossession and prolonged occupation?
Every development program, every project, every economic act has to be
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judged in the context of whether or not it reinforces the occupation or
weakens it, whether or not it promotes dependency or self-reliance.
Some of the basic concepts of development that might be central under
normal circumstances lose their poignancy, while others, not even
relevant, take on decisive weight. The goal of providing employment, for
example, a constant feature of almost all development plans promoted by
the less-developed countries, needs to be heavily qualified in the case of
the occupied territories. Should employment be promoted even when
virtually all new entrants into the labor force serve as marginal day
workers in low-skill occupations in the Israeli economy? What is the
impact on the drive to achieve higher growth in an agricultural or
industrial operation when, beyond a certain limit defined by the
requirement of the local market, virtually all the extra output has to be
marketed through channels over which the Palestinian producer has no
control, that is, Israeli agents?
A useful way of approaching the issue may be to go back to a more
basic interpretation of the mission of social and economic development. It
is important to identify the economic activities or policies that maintain
social and political cohesion in a weak and vulnerable society under
conditions of occupation, impoverishment, and dispossession. Transposing
development concerns into the social and political sphere might serve to
inspire them with more specific content and thereby make the approach
more agreeable to what Palestinians call the resistance steadfastness; that
is, economic development that helps the Palestinians resist the Israeli
political and economic control.
West Bank economists seem to agree on an economic development
strategy for the West Bank based on "withdrawal to the Inside", 1 aiming
at achieving the independence of the Palestinian economy from the
occupation economy, which is exploitative in the short run and aims at
the uprooting of the Palestinians in the long run. At the same time,
most agree that due to the small size of the local market, this policy
should be supported by an expansion in relationships with the world
market.
Analyses of the West Bank economy concentrate on two issues. First,
the unequal exchange between the West Bank economy and the Israeli
economy and therefore the unequal development. Second, the export of
the Palestinian labor force and therefore labor surplus to the Israeli
economy. Although recommendations sometimes differ in minor details,
most allude to policies aimed at import substitution, reinforced by a
popular conviction of shifting consumption away from both luxury goods
and Israeli imported goods. These policies would result in building up
domestic savings and reducing the exploitation of and the dependency on
the Israeli economy. This, in turn, does not imply withdrawal from the
world market and dependency on a self-contained economy, but merely
emphasizes the vitality of an independent Palestinian economic body from
its Israeli counterpart based on political economic reasons (Samara and
Shahadeh, 1988). The emerging view of political independence as
depending on a revolution from the inside, as opposed to previous
dependence on outside struggle, renders independence from Israeli
markets vital. It is a necessary step, although not sufficient, for the
Expression often used by the Palestinian economist Adel
Samara.
success of any inside political struggle.
As withdrawal from the Israeli market occurs, exports to European and
Arab countries should be enhanced. Unfortunately, this policy could be
adopted only with rights to independent trade. Trade with Jordan is
restricted by regulations both from the Jordanian and the Israeli
governments. Trade with Europe is only allowed through an Israeli
export agency and is subjected to limited quotas. In 1986, the West
Bank has succeeded in acquiring rights to independent trade with the
European Economic Community (EEC) in agricultural and recently
manufactured goods. I will discuss this issue in detail in a later part of
this paper.
Based on the above argument, strategies for absorbing the Palestinian
labor force stand out as predominant. Samara (Samara and Shahadeh,
1988), a renowned West Bank economist, points out that at this stage the
agricultural sector should carry out this role mainly for two reasons.
First, the inability of the industrial sector to take up this role due to
the limitation of the local market, which does not imply any possible quick
expansion of the industrial sector. Second, the importance of re-
establishing the Palestinian village as a production unit in an attempt to
reverse the current trend of transforming the Palestinian peasants into
wage labor in the Israeli economy.
Change in the production structure in the West Bank is a necessary
step for development under any future political scenario of the West
Bank. Nevertheless, the change will affect adversely certain groups in
the society--mainly importers, exporters to the Israeli economy, and
certain segments of the labor force. Therefore, the success of any
development strategy in the West Bank requires Palestinian support and
conviction. In the meantime, the presence of the occupation cannot be
ignored. Development should be implemented through a popular
institutional framework; that is, the organization of cooperatives, the
struggle for free exports, the development of the home economy and the
establishment of a Palestinian credit agency and other projects that would
ensure the cohesion and ability to carry out these strategies.
UNDER-DEVELOPMENT AND DEPENDENCY OF THE WEST
BANK ECONOMY: MACROECONOMIC OVERVIEW
Since the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1976, the West Bank
production structure has been undergoing profound changes. The
occupation has transferred Israel into a state with an imperial economy,
relying for its well-being on the captive human and material resources of
the West Bank. As a consequence, the West Bank has been witnessing
dramatic demographic and economic changes. Changes are mainly
demonstrated by (1) the high rate of emigration and (2) the
restructuring of the West Bank economy to perform as a complement to
the Israeli economy. Both issues are of vital importance to the Palestinian
political struggle.
Due to the worsening economic, social, and political conditions under
occupation, the West Bank has been witnessing a high rate of emigration.
The West Bank performs a high natural population growth rate. As can
be seen from Table 1, annual natural population growth rate exceeds 3%
in almost all years between 1967 and 1987. Nevertheless, annual
population growth rate is much less due to population emigration.
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WEST BANK POPULATION: ANNUAL GROWTH RATES (1967-988)...
YEAR POPULATION ANNUAL GROWTH POPUATION NATURAL
(ND OF PEI RATE MOVEMENT INCREASB
_____ ('000) (%) (%) (%)
1967 585.9
1968 583.1 -0.5 -2.7 2.2
1969 52.5 0.2 2.3
1970 6078 1.7 -0.8 2.5
1971 6226 24 -0.4 2.8
1972 633.5 1.8 -1.2 2.9
1973 652.4 3.0 0.0 2.9
1974 669.7 2.7 -0.4 3.0
1975 675.2 0.8 -2.2 3.1
1976 683.3 1.2 -2.1 3.3
1977 695.7 1.8 -1.5 3.3
1978 708.0 1.8 -1.3 3.1
1979 718.6 1.5 -1.8 3.2
1980 724.3 0.8 -2.4 3.2
1981 731.8 1.0 -2.1 3.2
1982 749.3 2.4 -1.1 3.3
1983 771.8 3.0 -0.3 3.3
1984 793.4 2.8 -0.7 3.5
1985 815.5 2.8 -0.6 3.3
1986 837.7 2.7 -0.6 3.3
1987 868.1 3.6 0.1 3.4
1988 895.0
SOURCE: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1989,
No. 40, Central Bureau of Statistics -
Jerusalem
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I
The removal from the West Bank of its Palestinian residents has been
the continuous target of Zionist policies. Containing the Palestinian
population to a minimum facilitates the process of political control and the
insurgence of Israeli settlers in the West Bank in an attempt to
perpetuate the status quo or even facilitate the process of the West Bank
annexation to Israel. In addition, emigration contracts the productive
capacity of the West Bank and enhances its dependency on the Israeli
economy; this includes the transformation of the remaining population into
a cheap wage-labor pool to serve the needs of the Israeli economy.
A comparative analysis of the West Bank and the Israeli economic
performance clarifies the notion of unequal development. Table 2
contrasts Gross Domestic Product (GDP), sectoral outputs, employment
and productivity in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with their
counterparts in Israel. In 1985, while the percentage of the West Bank's
population of the Israeli population reached about 25%, the percentage of
its GDP of the Israeli GDP was about 3%. By sectoral output, the lowest
percentages were those of industry (1%) and services (2%). In addition,
the percentage of total employed people in the West Bank of total
employed people in Israel was 7%. This low percentage is a result of the
population age structure, unemployed women labor, in addition to a
generally higher unemployment rate in the West Bank. In any case, this
percentage again is the lowest in the industrial and the services sectors
(5%). Furthermore, average labor productivity in the West Bank is less
than one half that of Israel (44%), the lowest percentage occurring in the
industrial sector (20%). The above data show the underdevelopment of
the West Bank economy in contrast with the Israeli economy; the most
. . . - - -- - - - - --.-.-. .-.- - *. .-.* -. * -.-
- ~ ~ ~~ .... . . .....-- *-* ---- --  .* --
SOURCE: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1985,
No. 36, Central Bureau of Statistics,
.. ........................... .. .... ................................... - -.- -.--- --.-.-.--- --- -- --.--- 
-- -.- -.--..---- * .-.- -
Jerusalem
........... .... ....- -.-.-.-.-..--.-.---.-.--.----.-.--.-------------..-.------.-.----- 
-*- --... --- . .  ..... ... . . *......... ... . .
* Price level of the West Bank and Israel is the same
**Labor productivity is calculated as output per worker
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WEST BANK DRAEL WEST BANK/
ISRAEL
AGRICULTURE 209 1,323 16%
INDUSTRY 55 5,513 1%
... .. .. .. ... .. .. .. .. - .-- .- - .---- - .- .-. ------ ------ -----.. -.-.-.--.* -.. .-. .------ '.I . **-... .-- ....-
CONSTRUCIOIN 110 1,764 6%
SRVICES 320 13,450 2%
~~ ft~..... . . ....... ............ ~ ~%
AGRICULTURE 28 92 31%
INDUSTRY 17 332 5%
CNSTRRUCrION 13 115 11%
SERVICES 46 918 5%
AGRICULTURE 7,359 14,380 51%
......................... . . . . . -. ----.. ---.. -- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - ---- -- -
- - -* - -- -
INDUSTRY 3,293 16,605 20%
.... . ............ . . . . . . .. .. .. . --... ..- -- -..---.-- -- -- --.----  -- --.--- ..- --. - -. -- -*.- --.
CONSTRUCTION 8,594 15,339 56%
SAVICU R 6,987 14,651 48%
extreme differences occur in the industrial and the services sectors.
I will use general macroeconomic indicators to help highlight the effects
of the occupation's imperialist impact on the West Bank economy.
Gross Domestic Product
Problems in the West Bank economy are demonstrated in the domination
of transferred resources. The Gross National Product is about 1.5 times
the Gross Domestic Product, one of the largest ratios in the world.
Transfers are primarily from two sources (1) Palestinian laborers working
in Israel or abroad, mainly in Arab countries, and (2) Arab and
international aid. The reliance on transferred resources has been
increasing at a rapid rate. Although the percentage of workers
remittances of GNP in 1968 reached 5.2%, It increased to 29% in 1983.
These figures partially reflect the decreasing productive capacity of the
West Bank and its transformation into a dependent economy.
As Table 3 shows, while the percentage of both the industrial and
agricultural sectors of GDP declined between 1968 and 1983, the
percentage of the construction sector increased, and the services sector's
percentage was almost stable. The expansion of the construction sector
normally reflects an expansionary trend in the economy.2 In this case, it
is different. Expenditures are concentrated in housing basically due to
the influx of aid money channelled through Jordan. Aid money was
intended to reach individuals in an attempt to increase the Palestinians'
association with the Jordanian regime.
2 Construction activities in Israeli settlements in the West
Bank are not included in the West Bank statistics, where these
activities are carried out by Israeli firms.
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TABLE 3
GDP BY MAJOR ECONOMIC SECTORS AT CURRENT PRICES
(PERCENT)
1968 1975 1983
AGRICULTURE 36.3 30.3 26.9
INUSTRY 8.3 840.0 6.9
CONSTRUCTION 3.5 15.5 15.7
SERVICES 51.9 45.8 50.5
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Antoine Mansour, 1988, "The West Bank Economy",
in George Abed, ed., The Palestinian Economy:
Studies of Development Under Prolonged Occupation,
London and New York: Routledge, p.85
The Industrial Sector
In the West Bank, the industrial sector's percentage of GDP has
declined throughout the occupation years. Although it contributed up to
9% of the GDP in 1968, the percentage declined to 8.2% in 1975 and 6.5%
in 1980. Pickled olives, olive oil, and oil-based soap account for about
90% of the industrial sales, with the main surplus being exported through
Jordan. The second most important industrial product is construction
material with about 50% of the production sold to the Israeli market.
Sales of other industrial products fluctuate with the changing demand of
the Israeli market. Subcontracting to the West Bankers by Israeli
industries has been growing significantly in the last decade. This form
of production has been expanding through the utilization of previously
unemployed female labor. A Palestinian woman's wages amount to about 60%
of her equal in Israel. Although subcontracting in textiles and clothing
industry employs about one third of all workers in manufacturing, its
contribution to the manufacturing income is small due to its low value
added (Mansour, 1988, p. 91). The West Bank also suffers from
increasing growth of Israeli industrial zones that are analogous to multi-
national corporations in the less developed countries (Shadid, 1988, p.
125).
In addition to competition with Israeli subsidized goods, the industrial
sector has been suffering from discriminatory policies. For example, a
15% production tax is imposed by the occupation on the West Bank
industry while it is not imposed on its Israeli counterpart. In addition,
while a 15% value added tax on sales in the West Bank is computed in
Jordanian Dinars, which until very recently was a stable currency, the
Israeli industry pays the value added tax in the highly inflationary New
Israeli Shekels (Shadid, 1988, pp. 124-125)
Labor
The West Bank and Gaza labor markets have undergone a substantial
shift of labor force to the Israeli market, even though a palestinian
worker receives lower wages and lesser benefits than his/her Israeli
counterpart. Table 4 shows Palestinian employment by economic branch
and place of work. While total employment increased from about 100,000
to 120,00 people working in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (an
increase of 20,000), total Palestinian labor in Israel increased from about
15,000 to 64,000 (an increase of 49,000).
While the agricultural sector in the west Bank and Gaza suffered from
a loss in labor force, the Israeli agricultural sector absorbed an
additional 4,000 workers between 1970 and 1988. In addition, the
increase in employment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in all other
sectors is insignificant compared to that which occurred in Israel.
The Agricultural Sector
The agricultural sector in the West Bank has declined substantially
since the beginning of the occupation. Data presented in Table 5
indicate that the area under cultivation in the West Bank in 1981 is
smaller than it was just prior to the occupation. In addition, the number
of workers in the agricultural sector has declined by 20% between 1970
and 1988, as can be deduced from Table 4. Within the agricultural
sector, a transformation of production has occurred to satisfy the needs
............. .... ........................... 
.......
............... . . ........ .
................
......... 
. .
.................... .......... .
. ... .
.................. ... .. .. .. X.
X . X
.. . .............
...........T.NX ... ::i A '*- E,.........
.............. ................................ ......................................   ................... .....
PALESTIN I AN EM I LOYMENT B .Y S E LECTED ECONOMIC BRACNCHES AND PLACE OF WORK: 1970-1988:
................  : ..................... .......................... ........ I  ............... .............
YEAR TOTAL agriculur Induaty conunaion other TOTAL agrcultut lnduby conastnlo ohe
(000) (000) ('000) ('000)
1970 99.8 42.4 14.6 8.4 34.4 14.7 2.6 1.9 8.4 1.8
1975 91.9 31.8 14.5 7.7 37. 40.4 4.4 7.5 22.2 6.3
1976 92.6 31.4 13.8 9.3 38.2 37.1 4.5 7.8 18.4 6.4
1979 92.5 29.1 14.7 10.9 37.7 39.8 4.1 9.5 19.0 7.2
1981 94.3 31.3 14.3 10.1 38.6 40.6 4.0 8.5 20.3 7.7
1980 93.5 28.5 14.7 11.1 39.2 39.9 3.7 7.2 21.0 7.9
1982 97.5 31.3 15.5 10.3 40.4 43.0 4.0 7.7 23.3 8.0
1983 99.1 29.2 16.0 10.9 43.0 48.1 4.0 8.8 25.7 9.6
.. .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. .. ............... ....... ... ------------.... ----------------. -.. 
-. ....
1984 104.0 29.6 16.5 11.8 46.1 50.1 4.9 9.0 25.6 10.7
1985 103.8 28.3 16.8 12.9 45.8 47.5 5.1 7.9 24.8 9.7
1986 114.6 32.5 18.0 14.7 49.4 51.1 5.3 9.1 26.1 10.6
1987 114.7 29.8 19.0 14.0 51.8 62.9 6.2 11.1 30.4 15.2
1988 119.0 37.1 18.9 12.7 50.2 64.0 6.6 10.3 32.4 14.7
SOURCE: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1989
No. 40, Central Bureau of Statistics
Jerusalem
note: The above figures reflect only the legal workers in Israel.
Therefore, they underrepresent actual figures
by an estimated 25,000 workers
.. .....-...-. .-...--... -... -- .. - .-...- .-...-- . .  - .  * .--- ......-...-...-...-.. -. -. .--..
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. . .. ................................
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AREA UNDER CULTIVATION IN THE WEST BANK IN SELECTED YEARS: 1966-1981
............................................ I : ................ I ....................................................................................................... 
(MOUSANDS OF DUNUMS)
....................................... ...........................
TYPE OF LAND 1966 1968 1973 1974 1975 1976 1980 1981
IRUGATED 100 57 82 81 83 89 92 98
RAIN FED 1,980 1,988 1,941 1,939 1,878 1,931 1,859 1,909
TOTAL060 020 . 19
SOURCE: Mohammed Shadid, 1988, "israeli Policy Toward Economic Development
In the West Bank and Gaza", in George Abed, ed., The Palestinian
Economy: Studies of Development Under Prolonged Occupation,
London and New York: Routledge, p.12 8
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of the Israeli market (Shadid, 1988, pp. 127-128).
The Israeli occupation has adopted the "open bridge" policy which
allowed some of the Palestine production to be exported through Jordan
either to the Jordanian market or through Jordan to other, mainly Arab,
countries. This policy received criticism from some Palestinian economists
on the basis that it is a tool to get rid of Palestinian surpluses and to
reduce competition with Israeli agricultural products. In addition, it
serves the occupation's need for providing the minimum required income
for Palestinians, a situation that would require less spending by the
Israeli authorities (Shadid, 1988, pp. 127-128). Although these points
are valid, they are not significant. On the whole, the "open bridge"
policy serves as one source of support to the economic viability of the
West Bank.
Trade Balance
The balance of trade of the West Bank has been worsening. The
trade deficit has been increasing for multiple reasons. First, the
emigration of workers whether abroad or to the Israeli labor market has
decreased the productive capacity of the West Bank. Second, constraints
on trade with the outside world and the penetration of the West Bank
market by the Israeli products shifted the production structure in the
West Bank and resulted in a form of specialization that conforms to the
needs of the Israeli economy. Table 6 illustrates the worsening trade
deficit of the West Bank. Negative trade with Israel constitutes the major
part of the trade deficit. The West Bank has a positive trade account
with Jordan and a negative, but relatively small, trade balance with other
- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .. . ------ ---.---  - ---- - - .- - -- e * --- - -- --- -- *- -
'.IA..........
EXPORTS, IMPORTS, AND TRADE BALANCE: 1970-1988
(IN MILLIONS OF CURRENT US$)
. ... . .. .. .. ...... . ..... . .. .. ..... .... . .
..... .. . ...................................... . ........... ... ....... ......
EAN EXPORTS IMPORTS BALANCE EXPORTS IMPORTS BALANCE EXPORTS IMPORTS BALANCE EXPORTS IMPORTS BALANCE
1970 16.3 54.7 -38.4 13.8 3.6 10.2 0.4 6.6 -6.2 30.5 64.9 -34.4
1971 20.9 60.5 -39.6 18.8 3.8 15.0 0.5 11.5 -11.0 40.2 75.8 -35.6
1972 25.6 81.2 -55.6 25.5 4.5 21.0 0.4 12.7 -12.3 51.5 98.4 -46.9
1973 41.6 118.3 -76.7 15.8 3.9 11.9 0.4 10.1 -9.7 57.8 132.3 -74.5
1974 62.8 172.0 -109.2 26.2 4.8 21.4 0.7 15.3 -14.6 89.7 192.1 -102.4
1975 69.9 204.0 -134.1 34.7 5.0 29.7 4.4 21.1 -16.7 109.0 230.1 -121.1
1976 77.1 222.1 -145.0 42.6 3.7 38.9 3.5 22.0 -18.5 123.2 247.8 -124.6
1977 73.6 239.6 -166.0 43.8 4.7 39.1 1.0 22.2 -21.2 118.4 266.5 -148.1
1978 77.9 217.1 -139.2 61.6 5.0 56.6 1.3 28.8 -27.5 140.8 250.9 -110.1
1979 89.0 297.6 -208.6 57.9 5.0 52.9 1.1 45.5 -44.4 148.0 348.1 -200.1
1980 111.3 350.5 -239.2 76.0 5.5 70.5 1.7 47.7 -46.0 189.0 403.7 -214.7
1981 129.6 381.8 -252.2 74.2 7.3 66.9 1.4 38.6 -37.2 205.2 427.7 -222.5
1982 109.1 366.4 -257.3 90.5 8.9 81.6 1.0 43.2 -42.2 200.6 418.5 -217.9
1983 134.0 406.9 -272.9 65.9 6.8 59.1 1.1 39.0 -37.9 201.0 452.7 -251.7
1984 99.9 363.1 -263.2 83.5 8.2 75.3 1.1 35.5 -34.4 184.5 406.8 -222.3
1985 96.1 339.5 -243.4 69.3 8.7 60.6 1.0 38.3 -37.3 166.4 386.5 -220.1
1986 155.9 451.0 -295.1 83.3 10.9 72.4 0.9 50.1 -49.2 240.1 512.0 -271.9
1987 160.5 580.7 -420.2 66.4 9.4 57.0 1.3 49.0 -47.7 228.2 639.1 -410.9
1988 41.7 9.5 32.2 1.2 41.2 -40.0
SOURCE: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1989,
.................... . .................. ... .............................. I ........................ .................... .......................................................... ....................
No. 40, Bureau of Central Statistics,
............. ...................................  ... .......... ............... ................  . ......... .... ............... .............................................
Jeruslaem
............... ............. .. .................... .............................   ..... I ........ ........  I .  ........ ......
...... .... .... ........ .......... 
m
. ......... ...  .............. ...... ....... ........ : .......... .... I ......... . ......I ..... ....... .... I 
countries.
The evolving dependency of the West Bank economy on the Israeli
economy is illustrated in Table 7. While about two thirds of agricultural
exports are oriented towards the Jordanian market, more than 90% of the
West Bank imports come from Israel. Nevertheless, the share of the
Jordanian market in the industrial exports of the West Bank declines due
to their adherence to the League of Arab States Special Bureau for
Boycotting Israel, which confines manufacturing exports to those relying
on inputs available locally or imported through Jordan. The relatively
high share of the Israeli market in manufactured exports is mainly due to
subcontracting in textiles and clothing. About 90% of manufactured
imports of the West Bank are from Israel. Furthermore, despite the small
population of the West Bank, it comprises the second largest market for
the Israeli exports after the United States, as can be seen from Table 8.
CONCLUSIONS
The West Bank has reached a state where its growth is conditioned by
the development and expansion of the Israeli economy to which it is
subjected. As Dos Santos argues, this is a classical characteristic of
dependency of the periphery on the industrial core where "the relation of
interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and
world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the
dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other
countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that
expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their
TABLE 7
. .... .. .. . ... . .. ... .... ... . ..... . -" -. -.-.-*.*.
EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS BY PARTNER COUNTRY: 1984
(PERCENT)
AGRICUL.TURAL PROUCT NIUSTL PRODUCTS .TOTA
COUNTRY EXPORTS IMPORTS EXPORTS IMPORTS EXPORTS IMPORTS
JORDAN 66.3 0.1 38.3 2.4 45.3 2.0
ISRAEL 33.7 93.3 60.9 88.4 54.1 89.3
OTHER 0.0 6.6 8.0 9.2 0.6 8.7
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: Antoine Mansour, 1988, "The West Bank Economy",
in George Abed, ed., The Palestinian Economy:
Studies of Development Under Prolonged Occupation,
London and New York: Routledge, p.93
mw i
ISRAELI EXPORTS BY DESTINATION IN SELECTED YEARS: 1970-1985
(MILUONS OF CURRENT US $)
USA WST BAINK UNITED SOUTH
YEAR AND GAZA KINGDOM AFRICA
1970 149.1 73.9 81.4 10.7 :
1975 307.5 367.7 169.3 34.7
1980 953.9 571.6 465.5 79.2
1982 117.7 639.6. 416.5 74.2
1983 1,329.2 680.5 412.9 82.8
1984 1,638.0 649.9 481.5 104.4
1985 2,138.0 611.4 477.0 63.8
SOURCE: Mohammed Shadid, 1988, "Israeli Policy Towards Economic Development
In the West Bank and Gaza", in George Abed, ad., The Palestinian
Economy: Studies of Development Under Prolonged Occupation,
London and New York: Routledge, p.123
note: Figures exclude East Jerusalem. Israeli exports to East
...----- ..-.-- .------- -----------+ .-.--- . ----.---------------...-..--.-----.-----.-----.------ ..-.----------------- .  . ---------------..-------.-.-- .' ''-- ---. ..-.-.-.*.-.*.-.*
Jerusalem are estimated at about 25% of total Israeli
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immediate development" (Gilpin, 1987, pp. 282).
Intentions of the Israeli government to establish such a relationship
between the West Bank and Israel has been expressed in the military
administration official assertions that "the administration diligently
develops services for the welfare of the population, and encourages local
and external initiatives in the economy and the development of new
projects-this, of course, provided that there is no conflict with the
security and economic interests of Israel" (Kahan, 1987, p. 16). Clearly,
the Israeli government view independent development of the West Bank
economy as contradictory to the Israeli interests. Similar to other
colonialist powers, Israel has established monopolies through the extension
of its political hegemony and by enforcing complex systems of legislative
prohibitions.
Under such conditions, and in order to arrive at any level of
sustainable development, the West Bank will have to adopt policies that
reduce its dependency on the Israeli economy. This could initially be
carried out by import substitution policies. Due to the small size of the
local market, however, these policies should be accompanied by attempts
at expanding West Bank exports and outside market. Pressing issues,
such as the Palestinian employment in Israel, should be emphasized in the
long term goals of the development strategy and alternatives for
employment in the West Bank should be provided.
CHAPTER TWO
THE OLIVE OIL INDUSTRY: HINDRANCES TO DEVELOPMENT
Changes in the agricultural sector have received special attention since
the beginning of the occupation. This importance stems partly from its
role in the local economy as it composes 20%-30% of the West Bank Gross
Domestic Product. However, the agricultural sector plays a vital role in
food security for Palestinians under occupation. It also has direct a
bearing on land and water use, both of which are at the root of the
Palestinian- Israeli conflict.
The total area of the West Bank is 5,572 square kilometers, 36% of
which (about 2,000 dunums) are actively cultivated. This is a relatively
high percentage, taking the topographic nature of the West Bank into
consideration. Hisham Awartani, a professor at Al-Najah University,
argues that if an expansion in the area cultivated is sought, essentially
for political reasons, it may not be deemed viable on economic grounds
because of the high cost of reclaiming low-quality land. If wider
cultivation is deemed necessary, owners of such land will have to be
assisted' (Awartani, 1988, p. 141). This argument reflects the extreme
importance of the agricultural sector in the political struggle of the
Palestinians.
The agricultural sector problem is manifested in the drain of labor to
' It's important to note that currently, the West Bank depends
heavily on foreign aid. Accordingly, assistance to the
agricultural sector at this stage implies channelling foreign aid
to agricultural activities.
the labor market in Israel. That is almost entirely due to a severe
decline in the profitability of all major production sectors. Farmers are
being compelled by low profits and substantial losses to make the
"rational" choice to give up farming and look for alternative sources of
income. The crux of the profitability problem is that the price system for
production inputs and farm produce has been radically restructured to
the disadvantage of farmers. The cost of major inputs, such as labor,
animal ploughing, and irrigation water, has increased by five to eighteen
times, while the price of vegetables and olive oil, for example, increased
only by two to three times. The reason is the unrestricted entry of
Israeli farm produce to the occupied territories' market (Awartani, 1988,
p. 145). In addition to the higher efficiency of the Israeli agricultural
sector, Israeli farm products are subsidized. Both elements render the
penetration (of these products) of the West Bank and Gaza Strip markets
easy.
In this chapter, I will explore hindrances to agricultural development
using a case study approach of the olive oil industry in the West Bank.
While some of the problems discussed might be specific to the case study,
most of the problems could be generalized to include the agricultural
sector. In the first part, I discuss the rationale for the choice of the
olive oil industry as a case study; its relative importance, in addition to
its role in an national development strategy. Subsequently, I analyze the
three main stages of olive oil production; that is, cultivation, pressing
and marketing. The aim is to explore hindrances that face the
development of the industry. Finally, I analyze the importance of the
olive oil industry in surplus, income, and employment generation.
OLIVE PRODUCTION: RELATIVE IMPORTANCE
Olive production plays a prominent role in the economic structure of
the West Bank in various aspects. Olive trees are characterized by their
ability to survive hard weather and soil conditions. Olive groves are
usually found on land mostly unsuitable for any other agricultural
activity, particularly hilly land; therefore, olive groves occupy land of
very low or even zero opportunity cost. In addition, olive production is
characterized by the use of under-utilized labor force, such as women
who are not in the labor force, old people, in addition to school children
who usually help out after school hours. This fact plays a major role in
maintaining the profitability of olive production in the West Bank as labor
costs continue to increase.4
Olive production in the West Bank fluctuates considerably. Table 9
shows olive production as a percentage of the total value of agricultural
production. Olive production constitutes around 50% of the value of the
agricultural production in good years and reaches as low as 6% in bad
years. On average, olive production constitutes around 20% of the total
agricultural production. Specifically, olive production has a high impact
on income distribution in areas where olive groves are concentrated and
constitutes a major resource for income (Awartani, 1980, p. 3).
Agricultural products comprise the major part of the West Bank
exports to Jordan. Table 10 shows that while agricultural goods comprise
about 65% of total exports, olive oil by itself contributes about 28% of
total exports.
* An interview with Hisham Awartani, the director of the Rural
Research Center at Al-Najah University.
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T A B L x x
OUTPUT VALUE BY CROP TYPE: 1978/79-1987/88
(PERCENT)
........ ...1 1 9 7 9 /8.. ....I1 8 4 .........................................3 1 .9 8..8 .......
SW' r 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
IELD CROPS 10.7 6.5 9.7 5.6 9.3 8.5 6.2 2.7 6.7 6.2
VE(ETABLES AND POTATOES 25.5 15.8 22.9 21.9 28.1 26.3 30.5 16.9 36.7 24.0
MELONS AND PUMPKINS 0.9 1.8 3.2 3.0 7.8 8.7 9.9 4.7 9.6 3.2
OLIVES 24.0 52.0 26.6 42.9 25.7 20.0 16.1 47.0 6.3 38.0
CIRus 12.9 7.0 12.2 7.9 8.8 12.3 13.1 7.6 12.5 8.3
OTHER PRUIT 26.0 16.9 25.4 18.7 20.3 24.3 24.3 18.5 23.4 18.2
MISCELLANEOUS 2.7 4.8 2.1
SOURCE: ::Statistical Abstract of Israel, Relevant Years,
Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem
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** * - **
AVERAGE FOR 1981-1985
COMMODITY US $ % OF TOTAL
'nya~ ~~~ ......... 8.40. - 0
. . .... ................. . ............... .............. 
...... ... ' ... ....... ........... ... .................
A . ..ULTURAL0 0D 3, ...S ....................
OTHERS 18,427 18.7
MM UCTURED uO 3$ O 35 L
SAMINEH 17,671 18.0
SOAP 3,542 3.6
sTONE AND MARBLE 10,629 10.8
.............. ~ ~ ~ .. ..  . --.. -.-- -.-- - +- - - - - --.-- -* ' -. '- ' ' *
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SOURCE: Hisham Awartani," Agricultural Development
and Policies in the West Bank and Gaza",
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Olive production is consumed either as olive oil or pickled olives.
About 85% of the olive production is used for the purpose of extracting
oil, while the rest is pickled. In the West Bank, olive oil contributes
about 10% of the individual daily calorie intake and about 42% of the
individual intake of fat. These figures increase considerably in rural
areas due to almost complete dependency on olive oil (Awartani, 1980, p.
4). Olive wood is frequently used in the West Bank for heating
purposes, especially in rural areas. In addition, olive wood is used for
wood products sold to tourists, especially in the Bethlehem area. Low
quality olive oil is used as a main input in the soap industry in Nablus.
It is important, however, to note that the consumption of soap industries
of local oil has been declining due to its substitution with cheaper
European oil.
HOW DOES OLIVE PRODUCTION QUALIFY IN THE
WEST BANK DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
As discussed above, most of the olive production is directed towards
exports. According to the previous argument, economic development
policies in the West Bank should be targeted towards curtailing the link
with the Israeli economy through import substitution. This implies
prioritizing the production of importable goods rather than expanding the
production of exportable goods. Does this mean that olive production
should not be expanded while other agricultural production should be
increased? To answer this question, two issues have to be investigated.
First, does olive production consume resources that could otherwise be
used for the production of imported agricultural products? Second, does
olive production entail further dependency on the Israeli economy,
especially in terms of marketing? To analyze these issues, a more
detailed investigation into the structure of agricultural trade is needed.
In analyzing the first issue, resource allocation, the data indicate that
olive production does not use resources (that is, land and labor) needed
for the production of other agricultural products. This is explained by
the following discussion. Table 11 shows the supply of fruits and
vegetables in the West Bank by source and disposal for 1986/1987. Local
production exceeds local consumption in all items. The surplus is
exported mainly through Jordan. Nevertheless, the data show that the
West Bank is also an importer of fruits and vegetables from Israel. This
structure arises because Israeli agricultural products are more
competitive. Even though local production satisfies local demand, Israeli
agricultural products are still consumed locally; therefore, the reduction
of imports of fruits and vegetables from Israel cannot be achieved by an
increase in local production, but requires conscious consumption behavior
linked to consciousness of development policies.
The West Bank is a net importer of agricultural products from Israel.
This trade structure is mainly due to imports of wheat, meat, and
poultry. As Table 12 shows, the percentage of the West Bank imports
for total consumption has increased in 1986 to 84%, 50%, and 27% for
wheat, meat, and poultry, respectively. Wheat production has declined
drastically during the years of the Israeli occupation for mainly two
reasons. First, the overall change of the agriculture production
structure in the West Bank in a way that complements the needs of the
agricultural and industrial sector in Israel on the basis of comparative
-.-.-.... -...- -..
SUPPLY OF FRUITS AND VEGETABLES IN THE WEST BANK BY SOURCE AND DISPOSAL: 1986/1987
(THOUSAND TONS).. . . . . . . .............. ... ........... .
L O TOTAL LOCAL ISRAEL GAZA LOCAL JORDAN OTHER
S500.2 417.5 47.9 34.8 357.8 112.1 30.3
FRU..(.xcl. olives) 191.6 162.7 15.5 13.4 119.5 64.5 7.6
thereof:CrTRUs 103.1 90.7 0.7 11.7 54.6 45.0 3.5
GRAPES 36.0 34.8 1.1 0.2 . 22.4 11.0 2.6
VEOETABLES AND POTATOES 222.4 182.3 19.1 21.0 179.4 23.1 19.9
thereof:TOMATOEs 67.8 58.6 4.1 5.1 58.8 6.2 2.8-
-. ................ .... .. ..-. .--  . .-. .-- - . .- -.. ..-- -- --  ... . .-* * -  . ..-..-- -- ...-. .*. *  .-. . -
POTATOEs 24.3 18.2 0.6 5.5 12.9 9.1 2.3
MELONS AND PUMPKINs 86.2 72.5 13.3 0.4 58.9 24.5 2.8
SOURCE: Statistical Abstract of Israel, relevant years
.C.e .......... ............. ....-- - - - -. . ** *
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WEST BANK IMPORTS OF WHEAT, MEAT, AND POULTRY FROM ISRAEL: 1981-1986
(PER.CENT).
I ~ CALVU~QRT~flMJ................
YEASWHEAT MEAT POULTRY
1982 76 927
1983 52 25.... 17
1984 71 29 17
1985 78 42 28
.19 8 . 8...... -0 - - -- - -- - - - 2 8 ----- -- ------- - -.*.-.
SOURCE: Statistical Abstract of Israel, relevant years
Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem
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advantage. In addition, shifts in production occurred due to the
inability of some products to compete with similar Israeli products.
Second, the switch of the Palestinian peasantry into wage labor in Israel
has greatly affected the production of field crops, characterized by its
labor intensive nature (Samara, 1989, pp. 73-78).
Although olive groves are cultivated in hilly areas, the cultivation of
wheat requires a relatively flatter area. In addition, olive cultivation
requires the use of seasonal employment. Its production, therefore,
would not have negative effects on other agricultural activities in terms
of labor availability.
In summary, olive production does not compete for resources with the
production of either of the above items, in terms of either land or labor.
It does not use resources that could otherwise be used for the expansion
of the production of imported agricultural goods. Under these conditions,
agricultural activities that create an incentive for the Palestinian peasant
to stay in the agricultural sector either through the provision of income,
as in the case of olive production, or employment, as in the case of field
crops production, should be encouraged.
As for the issue of the dependency of the West Bank exports on the
Israeli market, it is clear in the case of olive production that this
concern does not apply. Olive oil exports are mainly marketed through
Jordan and do not depend on the demand in the Israeli market.
Nevertheless, exporters to Jordan have to acquire permits from the
military administration, which makes the issue of exports vulnerable to
any changes in the Israeli policies and whims. This issue requires a
further examination of alternatives and possibilities for an independent
export operation, a point that I will discuss later in detail.
To complete the above analysis, a study of the profitability of the
olive oil industry is essential. As will be shown later, this industry
plays an important role in income generation. In addition, its
profitability could be improved by several measures as I will discuss
later.
OLIVE CULTIVATION
FACTS AND PROSPECTS FOR DEVELOPMENT
The West Bank can be divided into four main agricultural zones. First
is the north western area. Due to the high rainfall and the flat
topography in this area, production is concentrated in field crops in
winter and groundwater-irrigated vegetables and citrus fruits in summer.
Second is the Central Mountains which depend entirely on rainfall. This
area mainly produces field crops and olives. Third is the Eastern
Mountains with very little rainfall. This area produces only field crops.
Fourth is the Jordan Valley which depends entirely on irrigation from the
Jordan river and nearby springs. Due to its high dependence on
irrigation, this area produces vegetables and citrus fruits.
Olive groves are spread mainly over the Central Mountains due to
adequate amounts of rain fall. The hilly nature of the area renders it
hard to cultivate any different agricultural product without very high
reclamation costs. Table 13 shows areas cultivated by olive groves in the
eight West Bank districts. The northern districts, Tulkarem; Jenin; and
Nablus, compose about 75% of the area cultivated due to their relatively
large area in addition to their high share of rainfall which declines as we
... ,........ ....... - ............- . e . e.. ... -- --.. .. *.* -''*' *** '' ''* *.*** -' '-'.'''' '' ''.-'
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OLIVE GROVES: AREA CULTIVATED BY MAIN DISTRICTS IN THE WEST BANK: 1980
ARE v LIAED(0 UUS
DINjNiCI PRODUCTIVE
TULKARE., . .. .. ............ ..........
JEN1N
NABLUS
................. 
. .. .....RAMALLAH
JERUSALEM
... ...... .... .. .......JERICHO
BETHLEHEM
HEBRON
210.0
--.. .. ... - . . -- - - -...
131.6
147.2
141.5
1.6
13.8
20.1
NONPRODUCTIVE
19.1
7.6
8.9
6.4
1.0
25.9
PRODUCTIVE AREA
CULTIVATED (%)
31.5
19.8
22.1
21.3
0.2
2.1
3.0
ITOTAL 665.8 68.9 100.0
SOURCE: Hisham Awartani, "Agricultural Development
and Policies in the West Bank and Gaza",
in George Abed, ed., The Palestinian Economy:
Studies of Development Under Prolonged Occupation,
London and New York: Routledge, p. 147
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move south. Ramallah district is also characterized by its large
contribution to olive production. If compared to its total area, the area
of land in the Bethlehem district cultivated by olive groves is high
despite the fact that it is one of the smallest among the eight districts.
It is noticeable that the Hebron district specializes in vineyard
cultivation. Therefore, its contribution in olive production and
cultivation is small. This renders the thought of expanding olive
cultivation in this area possible. This can be beneficial in both
diversifying its production and the utilization of land that might be
unsuitable for any other agricultural activity without huge amounts spent
on land reclamation. Land reclamation costs and the cost of expanding
area cultivated by olive groves will be discussed in Chapter Three.
Olive cultivation in the West Bank suffers from two main problems;
olive yield fluctuations and the quality of olives produced. As mentioned
before, an outstanding characteristic of olive production in the West Bank
is its significant fluctuations. This is attributed to mainly five factors:
(1) inadequate rainfall during the winter, (2) inadequate weather
conditions, mainly frosting or excessive heat, (3) low-quality soil and
absence of nutrients, (4) inadequate picking methods that affect future
production of olive trees, and (5) alternate bearing that characterizes
olive trees, with high yield occurring every other year.
Due to the role that olive production plays in both the agricultural
production and exports, olive production fluctuations need to be
analyzed. As complete control over the produce Is impossible, I will
discuss below some technical factors that help decrease these fluctuations.
Improving the quality of olives produced is another important factor to
analyze. It affects the amount of olive oil extracted and the quality of
olive oil produced. This plays an important role in both determining the
price and the profitability of olive production. The points discussed
below deal with this issue as well.
Ploughing
Ideally, the process of ploughing should be carried out in three
stages: Deep ploughing before the rains (20-25 cm) to enable the soil to
absorb as much rain as possible, medium ploughing after the initial
rainfall (10-15 cm) to eliminate weeds, and surface ploughing after the
conclusion of the rains (10 cm) to eliminate the remainder of weeds.
A study carried out by a Palestinian botanist, Sumal'ah Nasser, in the
late seventies indicated that only 10% of the peasants growing olives
plough their land three times, 50% plough the land two times, 10% plough
once, and 10% do not plough the land at all (Nasser, 1980, p. 29). The
level of ploughing has been deteriorating due to a rise in the cost of
labor greater than the rise of olive and olive oil prices. Ploughing is
still done traditionally and therefore is dependent on manual labor. This
explains the high adverse impact of labor wages on the amount of
ploughing. In contrast, although a peasant can traditionally plough two
and a half dunums of land per day, he can plough 15-20 dunums with the
use of tractors.
Fertilization
The lack of fertilizers causes a deficiency in carbohydrates and
necessary hormones for a healthy growth of olives. Nasser's study
mentioned above illustrated that only 14% of the peasants use chemical
fertilizers, 76% do not acknowledge the importance of fertilizers, and 10%
believe that chemical fertilizers have an adverse effect on trees.
Peasants who used fertilizers had an increase of 30-50% in production.
Pruning
Flowering occurs on branches that are two years old. This means that
every branch carries olives once in its lifetime. Pruning is necessary for
eliminating old branches to enhance the ventilation of new branches. In
addition, eliminating old and unproductive branches helps provides
sufficient nutrients and water for new branches. It is also important in
eliminating diseases, and reducing the tree size in a way that facilitates
the picking process (Nasser, 1980, p. 42). Pruning can be done either
by the use of a manual saw or a mechanical saw. A mechanical saw can
prune 15-20 dunums per day, while a manual saw can only prune half a
dunum per day. While the olive groves in the northern districts of
Tulkarem, Jenin, and Nablus are seen as lacking adequate pruning, those
in Ramallah are described as having adequate pruning (Awartani, 1980,
p. 11). Inadequate pruning is again viewed as a result of high labor
cost.
Disease Protection
Olive groves in the West Bank are mainly affected by the "olive
insect" which is capable of destroying up to 60-80% of total production.
In addition, it increases the acidity in the rest of the yield with a
negative effect on its economic and nutritional value.
The study by Nasser shows that 84%-92% of the villages in the West
Bank are affected by this insect. This illustrates the excessive neglect
of conducting any measures for disease protection, a matter that is mainly
due to the lack of a national authority that holds a concern and would
carry out a large scale literacy program. The Israeli occupation's control
and prohibition of local Palestinian activities will be discussed later.
Olive Harvesting
The harvest season for olives lies between late September and the end
of November. The optimum date depends on the geographical location and
weather conditions. Harvesting is carried out by one of five methods.
First, hand picking which is best for both the tree and the harvest.
Nevertheless, it is the most labor-intensive method where one laborer can
pick only 50-70 kgs per day. Second, the use of rakes, which is more
productive than the first. A worker can pick 25-35 kgs per hour.
Nevertheless, this method is harmful to the leaves. Third, the use of
canes and rods which is the worst for the tree and the harvest;
however, it is widely used due to the fact that it is less labor intensive.
Fourth, mechanical method by spraying trees with chemicals and then
mechanically shaking the tree so that olives will fall down. Although
very efficient, this process carries many disadvantages; high cost,
adverse effect on trees, and the demand of large distances between trees
and a fairly flat area.
While the whole process of ploughing, pruning, and fertilizing requires
about 6 days per dunum, harvesting requires about 1.4-13.3 days per
dunum, depending on the kind of tree and the season (Nasser, 1988, pp.
46-47).
Conclusions
The absence of necessary basic attendance and the malpractice in
process of cultivation and harvesting can be attributed to three factors.
First, the relatively high cost of labor force that is a direct result of
the interaction with the Israeli market. The high opportunity cost of
labor in Israel has raised labor wages in the West Bank. Although
Palestinian labor is considered to be a relatively cheap labor in Israel, it
is considered to be relatively expensive in the West Bank due to different
economic and production structure (the West Bank production sectors are
less productive and are more labor intensive than their counterparts in
Israel). The problem accordingly surfaces in extreme neglect for land.
Table 14 illustrates the percentage of actual days spent attending to olive
groves of total required days. On average, the percentage is very
small. In addition, share cropping as a solution to high labor cost is
evolving in the West Bank. Of large grove owners, 30-50% resort to this
method giving up one-third to one-half of their harvest for peasants who
have the required labor force (Awartani, 1981, p. 30).
Second, the dependence on traditional labor-intensive methods in
production intensifies the effect of high labor cost on the agricultural
ACTUAL TO REQUIRED WORK DAYS IN ATTENDING TO OLIVE GROVES
NUMBER OF PEASANTS ACTUAL WORK DAYS. ACTUAL TO REQUIRED
(%) PER YFAR (%)
10 3.5 53.8
20 1.9 29.3
10 1.7 25.5
40 1.3 20.0.
20 1.0 15.3
SOURCE: Sumai'iah Nasser, 1980, Zaitoon Falastin Wa Mushkilatuh (Paletinian
Olive Oil and Its Problems), Office for Research and Documentation,
............................... ...........--- .--. ..- .. .......-.-----'-. -.- ...-----.=. .-- .e**e..... *-.. -*-...West Bank: Birzeit University, p. 49
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sector. Third, the absence of an institutional framework for the
organization and support of the agricultural sector in general. The
presence of such an institution is essential for coordination, credit
provision, in addition to the support and initiation of literacy programs.
As I view mutual problems in the three stages of production (that is,
cultivation, pressing, and marketing), I will put forth recommendations in
Chapter Three, subsequent to the discussion of olive pressing and
marketing.
OLIVE PRESSING
According to a survey carried out by the Rural Research Center at
Al-Najah National University in 1982, the West Bank has 300 olive
presses' located in 148 villages. The number of olive-producing villages
is 375 (Sawalha and Awad, 1982, p. h). Olive presses in the West Bank
vary in their technology level depending on the period in which they
were established.
Old presses have been established in the 1920s and continued to be
introduced up to the late 1960s. They constitute about 69% of total olive
presses in the West Bank. Old presses are composed of three main
devices: a crushing stone, a piston for pressing, and a separating device
to part olive oil from the other liquids. Although these presses are
operated by electrical power, most of the process is done manually,
including the transfer of the product from one stage to another.
' According to the Statistical Abstract of Israel, the number
of olive presses in the West Bank in 1982 is 251. Because the
rural research center has carried out a field research, I will
adopt its figures when available.
Semi automatic presses have been introduced in the early 1970s and
constitute about 24% of total olive presses. They are also composed of
the three main devices available in old presses, but are easier to operate,
faster, and more efficient. An addition to old presses is the washing
device. Semi automatic presses are operated by electrical power and use
mechanical levers to transfer the product from one stage to another.
Full automatic presses have been established in the late 1970s. They
constitute about 7% of total presses. The main characteristic of automatic
presses is the use of centrifugal force in place of pressure for extracting
oil. They contain a device for removing leaves in addition to a washing
device. These presses require more electrical power and water usage
than old presses while they need less labor.
Issues and Options
Issues confronting the olive oil pressing process revolve around two
points.' First, the distribution of olive presses as related to the density
of olive production. Second, the question of the feasibility of investment
in modern machinery. The discussion below will focus on these two
issues.
First, I will discuss the efficiency of olive-press distribution. Table
13 provided earlier, shows area cultivated by olive groves by district.
The Tulkarem area constitutes the highest percentage of productive
cultivated area (31.5%), second is Nablus (22.1%), and third is Ramallah
(21.3%). Although the average area per olive-press in 1980 in Tulkarem
6 I developed the following points from an interview with a
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) official in the West
Bank, supported by further research.
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is 1797 dunums, it is 3848 dunums in the Nablus area and 2013 dunums in
the Ramallah and Bethlehem area. A non-uniform distribution of olive
presses among the different districts can be noticed. In fact, bias in
olive-press distribution is aggravated within each district. For example,
in the southwestern part of the Ramallah district, olive groves cover
about 18,000 dunums in 15 villages. The area has 13 modern olive
presses. In contrast, while cultivating 50,000 dunums by olive groves
(in 15 villages), the northwestern part of the district has only 4 modern
presses. Given that every 10,000 dunums of olive groves require one
modern press, and assuming similar press sizes in both areas, It could be
concluded that the former part of the district is characterized by an
excessive supply of presses while the latter suffers from a shortage
(Barghouti, 1987, p. 20).
Reasons for the uneven distribution of olive presses could be
summarized in three points. First, the lack of a national planning
authority to study and control the establishment of olive presses. The
Israeli military administration is the only authority that issues permits for
the establishment of any industrial activity including olive presses. The
occupation's decisions depend on criteria that serve the Israeli economy
and are far from taking into consideration the welfare of the West Bank
population. Second, the occupation's bias in giving permits for the
establishment of new presses. Permits are given to influential people or
people in good terms with the authorities. Third, bias in acquiring
credit; credit is mainly channelled through Jordan and is directed to
people with good connections with the Jordanian regime.
The poor distribution of olive presses affects olive oil production in
several ways. The profitability of olive oil production decreases as a
consequence of high transportation costs. Most farmers, in an attempt to
reduce transportation costs, tend to accumulate olives and extend storage
time; a practice that has an extreme adverse effect on the quality of
produced oil. Shortage in olive presses also facilitates monopoly
practices. On the other hand, an excessive number of olive presses is
clearly a wasted capital investment. In addition, small olive presses are
the ones to be affected by the excessive establishment of modern olive
presses (Sawalha and Awad, 1982, pp. 2-3).
To analyze the issue of establishing modern presses against the
renewal of old ones, I will discuss the issues of cost, efficiency, quality
of oil produced, and profitability. The cost structure of presses has
changed significantly during the 1970s as can be seen in Table 15. The
cost of land and buildings have dropped relative to the cost of
machinery. While the cost of land constituted about 13% of the total cost
of olive presses in the 1940s, this percentage dropped to about 7% in the
1970s. The same applies to the cost of buildings where the percentage
dropped from about 38% to about 14%. Adversely, the percentage of
machinery cost of total cost has increased from about 50% to about 80%.
This is due to the introduction of modern machinery (automatic and semi
automatic) which are characterized by high fixed costs. The use of
modern machinery has escalated the fixed costs of olive presses from
about 10,000 Jordanian Dinars to more than 52,000 Jordanian Dinars.
Tables 16 and 17 show the structure of operating cost for old and full
automatic presses in both high and average yield years. In the case of
old presses, labor cost constitutes above half of the total cost in high-
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......................... :  .. ................... ......... ...... ..... ....
:CAPITAL COST OF OLIVE'i S- E** ii ... B**Y ITEM: 194*0-"1981
....................................................................................................... ...........................................  -  
::(CURRENT JORDANIAN DINARS)
......................... : ...................  ......  .............. ............. I ...... ....................
1941-1950 1951-1960 1961-1970 1971-1980
rra COST % COST % COST % COST %
LAND 437 12.3 1278 19.2 1257 12.8 3473 6.6
............ - - --... -.---- .-------.- -------- --- --- ---. -- - - -- - - -.-. - -- - - - -' *.-- -- .-- ' .
BUILDINGS 972 27.3 2021 30.4 3750 38.1 7313 13.8
MACHINERY 2154 60.5 3340 50.3 4831 49.1 42031 79.6
mr(rAt 2 3563 100.0 6639 100.0 . 838 100.0 52817 100.0
SOURCE: Feras Sawalha and Munir Awad, 1982, Olive Presses of the West Bank,
Rural Rescach Center, Technical Publications Series, No. 2,
................ ... -. ... I .. . .....----...---.....--..----------------.--------------......------------------------------------------ *---*......**---.-----'-''----------.. - --.. '' .-.- .-
Nablus, West Bank: Al-Najah National University, p.27
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.................... .. . .. ..... . .. . ..
............... ..........
.......  . .............
............................................ ................. ........................................ 
....
::OPERATING COST FOR A HIGH AND AVERAGE YIELD SEASONS: OLD PRESSES
............................................................ ........................................ ............................ 
 
:1979/1980 (HIGH YIELD), 1980/1981 (AVERAGE YIELD)
.......... I ...... I ...........................................  . ......................... ............. ..... 
197911980 1980/1981
.D. % OF TOTAL J.D. % OF TOTAL
ADMINISTRATION AND LABOR 1061 52.6 621 46.3
ENERGY 459 22.7 213 15.9
MAINTENANCE 53 2.6 229 17.1
.. ........I. .......... . ............. - --  .. ---.. ... .. ----. ... .. .. .-- - --..-- --..-- -- - -- - -- -.---.
OTHER 445 22.1 278 20.7
TOTAL 2018 100.0 1341 100.0
SOURCE: Feras Sawalha and Munir Awad, 1982, Olive Presses of the West Bank,
Rural Reseach Center, Technical Publications Series, No. 2,
Nablus, West Bank: Al-Najah National University, p.32
T A B L E 17 ..... ...................................................
OPERATING COST FOR A HIGH AND AVERAGE YIELD SEASONS: FULL AUTOMATIC PRESSES
1979/1980 (high yield), 1980/1981 (average yield. . . . . . . . . t979.....................98
MER~n000.D. % OF TOTAL J.D. % OF TOTAL
ADMINISTRATION AND LABOR 1021 28.4 970 40.4
ENERGY 1612 44.9 760 31.6
MAINTENANCE 200 5.6 352 14.6
OTHER 756 21.1 321 13.4
TOTAL 3589 100.0 2403 100.0
SOURCE: Feras Sawalha and Munir Awad, 1982, Olive Presses of the West Bank,
Rural Reseach Center, Technical Publications Series, No.2,
Nablus, West Bank: Al-Najah National University, p.32
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yield seasons. In average-yield years, the percentage drops from 52.6%
to 46.3% but remains the highest percentage of total cost. Energy cost
constitutes the second largest cost in high-yield years (22.7%).
Maintenance cost increases dramatically from high-yield to average-yield
years in both percentage and absolute terms.
In the case of full automatic presses, energy cost constitutes the
highest percentage of total cost in high-yield years (44.9%). This
percentage decreases in average-yield years, while the labor cost
percentage increases form 28.4% to 40.4%. Maintenance cost increases in
both percentage and absolute terms. The increase is less dramatic than
the case of old presses.
When comparing old and full automatic press operating cost, it is
important to keep in mind that the capacity of the latter might reach
twice the capacity of the former. Therefore, on the whole, the operating
cost of a full automatic press per ton of olive oil would be lower than
that of on old press. Automatic presses exhibit a better oil extraction
rate and produce 2-3% above that produced by old presses. In addition,
Lab tests showed that the quality of oil produced in full automatic
presses is superior (Sawalha and Awad, 1982, pp. 49).
Olive oil quality is one of the main determinants of the price of oil
produced. Said Assaf, a Palestinian expert in olive oil, argues for a
strategy in marketing Palestinian olive oil based on quality.' He argues
that due to the relatively small scale of olive production in the West Bank
compared to European olive producing countries, the West Bank needs to
7 An interview with Said Assaf, the director of the Arab
Institute for Research and Transfer of Technology (ASIR), Ramallah.
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maintain oil price at a higher level. He argues that the only way to do
this, and at the same time not affect demand, is by differentiating
Palestinian olive oil through better quality.
A feasibility study done by Sawalha and Awad (Sawalha and Awad,
1982, p. 38) shows that although existing old presses operate at an
average profit of +1500 Jordanian Dinars, half automatic and full automatic
presses operate at an average loss of 370 and 2205 Jordanian Dinars,
respectively. This is mainly due to the high fixed cost associated with
modern presses.
In summary, while automatic presses are characterized by high fixed
cost, they are capable of increasing the quantity of oil produced and
improving its quality. In addition, they are characterized by lower
operating costs per ton of production, especially labor cost. Renewing
old presses would be more feasible due to the high fixed cost associated
with modern machinery. Nevertheless, In view of the better quality of
oil produced and higher extraction rate, I recommend the introduction of
modern presses where a need for additional ones is proved.
Nevertheless, the feasibility of such a project should be addressed.
There are two issues that could be considered within the processing
stage to facilitate and improve olive oil marketing. First, the packaging
of the produced olive oil. Currently, olive oil is packaged in 17 kilogram
tin containers. Olive oil is packaged without any additional treatment for
color or acidity. Some West Bank experts suggest the introduction of
smaller containers to facilitate marketing, both locally and abroad." The
8 Based on an interview with both Hisham Awartani and a UNDP
official in Jerusalem.
large size of the current packaging limits its marketing to consumers who
require large quantities of olive oil. In addition, further treatment for
acidity and color should be introduced prior to packaging.
Second, the issue of quality control. Current practices in picking and
pressing adversely affect the quality of produced oil. These practices
include long storage time and inadequate cleaning of olives before
pressing, bad storage conditions, and the inclusion of damaged and dry
olives. The quality of olive oil produced affects demand and marketing.
Accordingly, quality control measures should be introduced. I will
discuss this point in further detail later.
OLIVE OIL MARKETING
As discussed before, the production of olives fluctuates significantly.
Table 18 shows the channels for the marketing of olive oil in both high-
yield and low-yield seasons. In high-yield seasons, about two-thirds of
the production is exported or stored. In low-yield seasons, production
does not even cover local consumption. The shortage is covered by the
use of oil stored in previous seasons.
Most of the olive oil produced is currently exported through Jordan,
either for the use of the Jordanian market, or to be transferred into
other, mostly Arab, countries. In addition to the occupation's policies,
the flow of the West Bank products into Jordan is governed by policies
laid down by the Jordanian Government and in coordination with the Arab
League's Boycott Office. This policy is reflected in the following
guidelines (Awartani, 1988, p. 147):
(a) No product originating in Israel is allowed to enter from the West
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MARKETING OF OLIVE PRODUCTION IN HIGH-YIELD AND LOW-YIELD YEARS
(TONS)
HIGH YIELD LOW YIELD
UVEPRODUCIION ...00,00O 30,000
PICKLED 15,000 10,000
PRESSED 85,000 20,000
DOMESTIC USE 8,000 7,000
EXPORTED OR STORED 11,100 2,000
MARKETED IN GAZA OR ISRAEL 2,000 1,500
USED PROM PREV10OUS SER O TORAGE 100 5,000
SOURCE: Hisham Awartani, 1981, Wagi Wa Mustaqbal Shajarat Al-Zaitoon Fi
Al-Daffah al-Garbich (The Reality and Future of the Olive Tree in
the West Bank, Rural Reseach Center, Technical Publications Series,
No. 1, Nablus, West Bank: AI-Najah National Universityp1
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Bank to Jordan. This has been satisfactorily achieved by several
measures.
(b) West Bank farmers can export to Jordan a maximum of 50 percent of
estimated yields.
(c) Yield estimates are made by officials in Jordan, and mostly at rates
of one-half to two-thirds of actual yields, because they are based on
yields prior to June 1967. Estimation of produce is the first step of a
series of exhausting procedures the producer has to go through in order
to acquire a permit to export. Permits are obtained from both the Israeli
military administration and the Jordanian government. First, the
producer obtains a document from the Ministry of Agriculture Office in
Ramallah proving that he owns a certain cultivated area of land. Second,
this document has to be taken to the Ministry of Agriculture in Jordan,
where an estimate of the expected yield is made. The producer is
permitted to export only up to 50 percent of his estimated produce.
(d) The number of trucks licensed for operation between the West Bank
and Jordan is limited to those that were in operation prior to June 1967
(about 400). This creates serious problems for exporters at times of
peak production.
(e) To be able to export, the producer is required to get a permit from
the Israeli military administration.
(f) The actual process of transferring the product from the West Bank to
Jordan is exhausting and causes damage to the products. Agricultural
exports might have to stay on the border between the West Bank and
Jordan for up to three days, under excessive heat especially in summer
time. In addition, trucks have to be unloaded and boxes emptied and
refilled as a security check. This causes extra costs and excessive
damage to the products.'
Farmers exporting to Jordan have limited control over the prices
received. Prices are set in Amman by marketing companies, mostly owned
by the Jordanian Government (Kahan, 1987, p. 72).
Exports to Western Europe, until very recently, had to be carried
through the Israeli export marketing organization Agrexo.1 Palestinian
agricultural exports are marketed under an Israeli label (Carmel), and as
Israeli products. Exports through Agrexo disadvantages the Palestinian
farmers since they are not originally incorporated, as in the case of
Israeli farmers, in a planning framework that coordinates the production
and the marketing processes. In addition to the high commissions it
charges, Agrexo imposes very limited quotas on Palestinian exports
(Kahan, 1987, p. 74).
The absence of free access to export markets provides obstacles to
large-scale farming. Small farmers, discouraged by the complexity and
uncertainty of the export process, are content with subsistence farming.
furthermore, the exhausting process of transferring the product across
the bridge to Jordan, in addition to the limitations on the numbers of
trucks allowed to cross the bridge increase costs of transportation beyond
the capacities of small farmers. In normal seasons, the cost of
transportation per trip reaches 200 Jordanian Dinars and increases up to
* According to an interview with Samir Hazboun, a professor in
the Department of Economics at Birzeit University.
10 Agrexo is a cooperative owned by the Israeli farming
establishment. Agrexo has a monopoly in the export of fruit,
vegetables and flowers.
600 Jordanian Dinars in good seasons."
Due to the relatively high cost of production of olive oil in the West
Bank, local olive oil suffers from competition with imported olive oil. In
addition, substitution of olive oil by other seed oils has been increasing.
PROFITS, INCOME, AND EMPLOYMENT GENERATED
BY OLIVE-OIL PRODUCTION
To be able to arrive at any policy recommendations, a look at the
significance of olive production in terms of surplus, income, and
employment generation is essential. Table 19 shows the costs and returns
associated with olive oil production. It indicates a profitability of 14.5
Jordanian Dinars in high-yield seasons and a loss of 4.2 Jordanian Dinars
in low-yield seasons. Assuming that every three high-yield seasons are
followed by one low-yield season, Olive-oil profitability averages to about
12 Jordanian Dinars.
Costs associated with labor comprise the highest share of total costs.
In high-yield seasons, the percentage of labor costs to total costs reaches
72%; ploughing cost constitutes about 44% of total costs, and picking cost
constitutes about 23%. In low-yield seasons, labor cost percentage
increases to about 94%. Pressing cost constitute a high percentage in
high-yield years (18%). Fixed cost and opportunity cost of land are not
included. Fixed costs of old groves are assumed negligible; olive groves
are characterized by a long life reaching hundreds of years, and
accordingly, the cost of land reclamation and cultivation over the lifetime
"' An interview with Samir Hazboun, professor in the Department
of Economics at Birzeit University.
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PROFITABILITY OF OLIVE OIL PRODUCTION PER DUNUM*
........................ ............................................................... 
... --..........--.--..-.-----..---.---------------.... ---. . ----------.. -----------... -. . -*'--
(1981 JORDANIAN DINARS, UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED)
......... .. .............. . . . . . . . . . . . .
.. .... T ........ ...... ... ............. . . . . . _ _ _ _ __......... ................. .......... .. ............................
PRODUCTION (KG) 150.00 20.00
EXTRACTION RATE (%) 25.00 27.00
.................................... ... .... . .---..--..-....--.--....---..-----..------.. .-- '-----------------... .... *-- - -- -*----*---------'-. ..... -' .- ..-. .-.- . .-
OIL PRODUCED (KG) 37.50 5.40
PRESSING COST (KG) 10% OF OIL PRODUCED 3.70 0.50
NET OIL PRODUCTION (KG) AFIER PRESSING COST 33.80 4.90
PRICE PER KO LOCAL PRICE 0.75 0.85
PRESSING COST (JD) 2.78 0.43
GROSS OIL PRODUCTION (JD) 28.13 4.59
PLOUGHING TWICE A YEAR, ANIMAL USE 6.60 6.60
... .. .= ,. ... .. .. .---- -- .. .. ... .. .- - ..e - - -- --- r. .. e- .*. .. .- ee ... **--"" ......-- * " - .-- - ' - - --- "- -" -" *  -- ------ .*  ''--" -... ..** . 
PRUNING ONE-THIRD WORK DAY 0.80 0.80
......................................--.-.---------------------------.---- 
--------.----.---..-.------------------.- **---*.*.*----.-3-'---9
FERTILrZERS NOT USED CURRENTLY
DISEASE PROTECTION NOT USED CURRENTLY
.. . ......... ........  .   .. ...... ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - . . . - - .. - - . - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - -* - - - - - - - -- -
PICKING 314 OF WHICH IS FAMILY LABOR 3.50 1.00
TRANSPORTATION :FARM-HOME-PRESS :1.00
...... . .. ... . . .... ............. - .. . .. . . .. .. .. . . .. . - -- - .-.. - -- - - -- - - --- --.- - - -- - - -- - - -- - - -- - - ---.-- - - -- -* *
PRESSING COST (ID) 2.78 0.43
BAGs AND TIN CONTAINERS DISTRIBUTED OVER 4 YEARS 0.40 0.10
TOTAL CASH OUTFLOW 15.08 8.93
.......... . .. ---.-.- --.- - -- --.- --.-.- -- - . -- . - -- - --.- - -- - - -- - - -- . * -
INCOME PROM OIL GROSS OF 10% PRESSING COST 28.125 4.2
SECONDARY INCOME SECONDARY PRODUCTs 1.5 0.5
TOTAL CASH INFLOW 29.625 4.7
NEFCASHFW ______________145 -2253
SOURCE: Hisham Awartani, 1981, Waqi Wa Mustaqbal Shajarat AI-Zaitoon Fl
Al-D2affahi al-Garbich (T'he Reality and Future of the Olive Tree in
the West Bank, Rural Reseach Center, Technical Publications Series,
No. 1, Nablus, West Bank: A-Najah National University, p.17.
* Study donemi 1981
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of old olive groves is very small. As for the opportunity cost of land,
Hisham Awartani, who carried out this study, argues that olive farmers,
for social and cultural reasons, would not even consider the idea of
transforming their land into the production of any other agricultural
product. Therefore, he assumes the opportunity cost of land to be very
low. Nevertheless, if we are to consider expanding olive cultivation, the
opportunity cost of land and fixed costs would be high. Reclamation
costs and opportunity cost of land should be considered.
Olive oil production has a significant effect on income level. As seen
in Table 20, the wages of a construction worker is almost one and a half
times that of an agricultural worker. This is due to the higher skill
level required in construction, in addition to the higher demand for
construction workers, generating mostly from the Israeli market. 12
Nevertheless, olive oil production could play a significant role in
supporting the income of both agricultural and construction workers.
The reclamation and cultivation of 20 dunums by olive groves would
increase an agricultural wage worker income by 26% and a construction
worker by 18%.
Although labor costs comprise the bulk of operating costs, employment
generated by this kind of project is seasonal and includes a high
percentage of family labor. Therefore, while such a project might not be
able to create sufficient full-time, around-the-year jobs, it is able to
provide a great support of income for rural families who primarily depend
on wage work.
12 Still, it is interesting to notice that the difference
between agricultural and construction wages in the West Bank is
much less than that found in most developing countries.
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TABLE 20
ESTIMATION OF INCOME GENERATING BY CULTIVATING 20 DUNUMS BY OLIVE GROVES
(1981 JORDANIAN DINARS)
FIXED COSTS/20 DUNUMS 135.0 assuming 2700 JD fixed cost distributed over 20 years
OPERTATING COSTSI2O DUNUM 301.6 assuming 15.08 JD operating cost/dunum*
RETURNS 592.0 assuming 29.6 JD returns/dunum*
NET INCOME20 DUNUMS 155.4
DAILY WAGES FOR AN AGRICULTURAL WORKER IN THE WEST BANK* 2.4
APPROXIMATE YEARLY INCOME (250 WORK DAYS) 600.0
PERCENT INCREASE IN YEARLY INCOME BY CULTIVATING 20 DUNUMS 25.9%
DAILY WAGES FOR A CONSTRUCTION WORKER IN THE WEST BANK** 3.4
APPROXIMATE YEARLY INCOME (250 WORK DAYS) 850.0
PERCENT INCREASE IN YEARLY INCOME BY CULTIVATING 20 DUNUMS 18.3%
* From data presented in Table 19
Approximation based on relative daily wages of West Bank
agricultural worker in Israel and a West Bank construction
worker in Israel. The ratio might not be the same for
West Bank wages, but is used as an approximation
Furthermore, the information provided above leads to an important
conclusion. The profitability of olive production could be increased by
decreasing labor costs. This could be done through mechanization of the
production process when feasible. In addition, mechanization of the
production process improves the quality of olive produced. This
increases profitability through better marketing and higher prices.
Mechanization in this case would not lead to an increased unemployment (a
result that should be avoided in any proposed project), since olive
production involves the use of seasonal employment. Income generated in
return would compensate for the loss of the seasonal jobs curtailed.
Nevertheless, such decisions should be based on further benefit/cost and
income-distribution analysis.
Profitability could also be increased by an increase in olive oil price.
This would be possible through quality control in addition to the
establishment of storage facilities to control the quantity of oil supplied in
good seasons. These facilities are currently almost absent (Salem, p.
83).
CONCLUSIONS
As this chapter analyzes the case of the olive oil industry, it
constructs a systematic outline, which could be used for the analysis of
any other production process. In the evaluation of any project, three
issues should be considered. First is an understanding of the role of
the specific industry in the general development objectives of the West
Bank; does this industry support self-reliance or enhance dependency?
what is its role in satisfying local consumption or providing exportable
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goods? This would help allocate resources in a fashion that satisfies the
West Bank development priorities.
Second is the impact of promoting the industry on three main areas;
surplus generation, employment, and income generation and distribution.
Whereas surplus Is the driving force of economic growth, equity is an
end that should be pursued constantly in development plans. Equitable
income distribution in the West Bank plays an important role in
maintaining social and political cohesion needed for the success of the
Palestinian political struggle. Employment generation is an important
issue, especially under the current political conditions, where the
Palestinian population is being transformed into unskilled wage labor in
Israel. Alternatives for Palestinian employment in the West Bank should
be supported. A decision on the relative importance of the industry
should be based on the three above parameters.
Finally, an investigation of the bottlenecks in the industry's
development is essential. Obstacles to an industry's development might
be specific to the industry itself, or they might be generalized on a
sectoral or even macroeconomic level. Policy implications and
recommendations could accordingly be put forth.
According to the above outline, the following conclusions apply to the
case of the olive oil industry. While it plays an important role in
satisfying local demand, olive oil contributes substantially to total
exports. Its production does not entail any dependency on the Israeli
market, since it utilizes local inputs and does not depend on the Israeli
economy for marketing. In addition, it does not compete on resources
needed for the production of other locally consumed agricultural goods.
The olive oil industry currently plays an important role in surplus
generation, especially under occupation conditions where the development
of other production activities would be difficult due to restrictions
imposed by the military authorities. While it only generates seasonal
employment, the industry provides for equitable income distribution where
olive groves are mostly owned by small land owners. Specific as well as
general obstacles to the development of the industry could be defined.
Detailed summary and recommendations are put forth In the next chapter.
CHAPTER THREE
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In the first part of this chapter, I will build upon the information
presented in Chapter Two. I will summarize the results of this study,
identifying the obstacles to the development of the olive oil industry, in
particular, and the agricultural sector, in general. Subsequently, I will
introduce the idea of cooperatives as an institutional framework for the
planning and coordination of development activities. I will then put forth
recommendations that target the development of the olive oil industry
taking into consideration the problems identified. I will conclude with
remarks on themes for future research.
OBSTACLES FACING THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE OLIVE OIL INDUSTRY
The olive oil industry, in particular, and the agricultural sector, in
general, suffer from obstacles to development that have common grounds
in all stages of production.
First is the high labor cost. As discussed previously, olive
cultivation suffers from the relatively high cost of labor force that is a
direct result of the interaction with the Israeli market. The high
opportunity cost of labor in Israel has raised labor wages in the West
Bank. Although Palestinian labor is considered to be a relatively cheap
labor in Israel, it has a relatively high cost in the West Bank due to
different economic and production structures. The problem accordingly
surfaces in extreme neglect for land. Similarly, high labor cost is an
issue facing the profitability of olive-oil production. Picking and
ploughing costs constitute a high percentage of total cost. Labor costs
also form a high percentage of pressing costs, especially in the case of
old presses.
Second is the dependence on traditional labor-intensive methods in
production. This intensifies the effect of high labor cost. Ploughing is
still carried out by traditional methods. Pruning is done largely by the
use of a hand saw. Picking is done in a highly labor-intensive fashion.
Third is the relatively small area of olive farms. Small land
ownerships emerged as a result of inheritance laws applied in the West
Bank. This results in higher costs due to the absence of economies of
scale. The small area of olive farms create high transportation costs per
unit of production. In addition, small-scale farming does not allow for the
adoption of new technology. Coordination in pressing and marketing is
difficult. On the other hand, small land ownerships enhance equitable
income distribution. Instead of encouraging large land ownerships, the
inefficiency of small land holdings could be solved by introducing
agricultural cooperatives that undertake the task of coordination among
small land owners.
Fourth is low productivity of land. This is reflected in the relatively
low profitability of olive oil production; it Is less profitable than the
cultivation of vineyards and almonds. This is due to several reasons.
First, the low density of olive groves. According to past peasants'
conceptions, olive trees in the West Bank are separated by distances that
are now considered to be larger than is needed for a healthy growth;
therefore, land is underutilized. Second, general illiteracy in attending
to land. This Is illustrated in the very small usage of fertilizers, bad
pruning and picking practices, and the absence of means to protect from
disease. These facts greatly affect the size of yearly yields.
Fifth is the distribution of olive presses. As discussed before, olive
presses in the West Bank are not distributed according to the volume of
olive production. This results in higher transportation costs, capital
losses, and lower quality oil.
Sixth is competition. West Bank olive oil have been suffering from
competition from mainly two sources. First, seed oils that are
characterized by a considerably lower price than olive oil (sometimes half
the price of olive oil). Whereas the universal consumption of olive oil
stayed constant between the years 1961-1971, seed oils consumption
increased by 125% (Awartani, 1981, p. 20). In addition to price
competition, seed oils are found to be more suitable for cooking purposes.
Second, the competition with imported olive oil. The West Bank and
Jordan import a relatively high quantity of olive oil from Mediterranean
countries. Imported oil is cheaper than local olive oil by 10-20%. In
addition, it is characterized by suitable packaging, whereas local oil is
packaged only in a 17 kg. tin containers. Competition with imported
olive oil drives down the price of local oil. In addition, in some cases it
is mixed with local oil and resold as West Bank oil. This adversely
affects consumers' conceptions of the quality of the West Bank olive oil
and accordingly affects price.
Seventh is hindrances to better marketing. The various restrictions
from the Jordanian and the Israeli governments on West Bank exports,
including olive oil, reduce incentives to expand or improve production.
These restrictions play a major role in discouraging commercial farming.
Most small farmers produce olive oil on a subsistence level and are not
interested in expansion or improvement due to the many problems and
obstacles in marketing.
Eighth is the issue of quality control. Currently, there is no
authority that enforces quality-control measures prior to local marketing
or exporting. On many occasions, the West Bank oil has been mixed with
a lesser quality imported oil and marketed as locally produced. As
discussed earlier, due to the relatively smaller scale of the West Bank
olive-oil production, marketing should be done on the basis of quality.
Therefore, quality-control enforcement is necessary in arriving at higher
prices and larger markets.
Ninth is the lack of finance resources. The agricultural sector in
general does not have sufficient access to seasonal, medium-term, or
long-term credit. Agricultural activities are financed primarily by personal
savings. The need for credit is imperative in the present setting if
production is to be made more efficient, costs are to be reduced and the
cultivated area to be expanded.
Finally, the absence of an institutional framework for the organization
and support of the agricultural sector in general. Most of the problems
discussed earlier exemplify the absence of a national framework that can
organize and coordinate various stages of production.
A national institutional framework Is especially needed for the
coordination and channeling of foreign grants and funds. Currently,
projects are almost arbitrarily chosen, with absolutely no coordination
among donor agencies. The director of the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) in Jerusalem explains that while UNDP usually
coordinates with the local planning agency for targeting projects, such an
institution is absent in the case of the West Bank. The UNDP is
therefore forced to fund projects on an arbitrary basis and on individual
requests from Societies in the West Bank. He also explains that
coordination and division of responsibilities is absent among the different
donor agencies. "
Further research incorporating the issues mentioned above should be
done. The challenge, however, would be in proposing solutions and
alternatives that are possible to realize even under conditions of
occupation.
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
The consideration of most of the issues mentioned above requires
planning on a national level. Currently, the West Bank lacks an
institutional framework with the authority to carry out such
responsibility. Subsequent to the 1948 war, the West Bank was merged
with Jordan. The latter expanded the authority of its institutions to
include the West Bank. Following the Israeli occupation in 1967, these
institutions maintained their offices in the West Bank. They continued to
undertake responsibilities, though at a very limited scale. For the
agricultural sector, an office affiliated with the Jordanian Ministry of
Agriculture is still functioning in the West Bank. The scope of its
"3 An interview with the director of the United Nations
Development Program in Jerusalem.
activities, nevertheless, is narrow due to the limited control that Jordan
currently has over the West Bank. To emphasize the Palestinian
independence of the Jordanian regime, an alternative is necessary. The
following discussion introduces agricultural cooperatives as a convenient
resolution to this issue.
The West Bank has 236 agricultural cooperatives, 57 of which have
been established after the Israeli occupation. About 142 are rural credit
and thrift. They were established before the occupation and are currently
inactive. Agricultural marketing cooperatives enumerate 40, of which,
there are 11 olive oil pressing cooperatives. These cooperatives provide
some marketing services to members, such as assistance in obtaining
documents for exports. Some provide seasonal loans in addition to
performing small- scale land reclamation (Arab Fund, 1985, p. 38). In
general, cooperative activities at the present time are limited.
The cooperative movement in the West Bank suffers from many
drawbacks. Political constraints imposed on the movement whether in
acquiring credit, importing, or exporting, In addition to the different
restrictions on projects it carries out, have limited the scope of projects
it could perform. This has resulted in its gradual shrinkage and
neutralization. Currently, activities performed by cooperatives do not
conform to any long-term plans or adequate research. In addition,
coordination among different cooperatives is completely absent.
The West Bank cooperative movement has been established under the
British Mandate. Due to their long presence, cooperatives are well
accepted among West Bank peasants; nevertheless, cooperatives in the
West Bank are not characterized by a large grassroots nature. Most of
the administrators are large land owners." Supporting low-income, rural
population in the West Bank therefore requires the restructuring of
cooperatives to involve small to medium land owners. One very
successful experience in creating a grassroots base has been carried out
by the Committee for Agricultural Revitalization, which has been
established in 1973 by an initiative from a group of young agricultural
engineers in the West Bank. The committee interacts actively with
peasants and is involved in marketing, produce improvement and literacy
campaigns. It specifically deals with small land owners, carries out home
visits and helps market their products. Its activities are mainly oriented
towards income generation for low-income families. The committee also
carries out research and formulates programs that conform to a general
West Bank development policy. A major part of the committee's activities
concerns product research and development.
The West Bank is currently undergoing vital structural changes.
Since the outset of the uprising in December 1987, the West Bank has
been rapidly building up an independent social, political, and economic
structure. The West Bank is currently politically, economically, and
socially organized and directed by neighborhood committees throughout its
cities and villages. These committees perform under a unified Palestinian
leadership. Under these conditions, it would be possible to restructure
cooperatives in the West Bank towards a grassroots character. Under
occupation, and in the absence of a national institutional framework for
the support and development of agriculture in the West Bank,
14 Based on an interview with Sumai'ah Nasser, a professor of
botany at Birzeit University.
cooperatives would serve as an alternative. In the case of the olive-oil
industry, many of the points recommended above would be best performed
by these cooperatives. First, they should perform as a legal umbrella for
receiving aid and credit from foreign and Arab sources. Due to the
occupation's limitations on credit transfer, cooperatives should be
registered as private nonprofit companies. Accordingly, they would be
able to receive external funding without the permission of the Israeli
military government (Gibson, 1984, p. 18).
Second, Cooperatives should serve as a coordinator among peasants,
including small land owners. This helps bypass the disadvantages of
small scale land holdings. Through cooperatives, farmers would be able
to adopt technology that incorporates high fixed costs.
Third, cooperatives should carry out campaigns that target illiteracy in
agricultural practices. Fourth, they should undertake the responsibility
of planning and establishing new olive presses where needed. In
addition, cooperative owned presses would play a considerable role in
reducing pressing costs if performing on a nonprofit basis.
Fifth, cooperatives should serve as a legal structure that conduct
quality control measures. In addition, they would represent olive oil
producers in marketing negotiations and price setting. They would be
able to campaign for import substitution and the consumption of local
products including olive oil.
The West Bank political and economic conditions are highly unstable.
Development planning should take into consideration these uncertainties
and flexibility to adapt to changes. Nevertheless, it must not wait until
exactly correct answers are found, but must adopt approximately the
right road and drive off. Thereafter, it must have the ability to make
whatever directional adjustments necessary to stay on the "road" (Gibson,
1984, p. 8).
RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations proposed will mainly target four areas: (1) expanding
the area cultivated by olive groves, (2) increasing profitability through
higher productivity and lower production costs, (3) expanding local and
outside markets, and (4) providing agricultural credit.
Expanding the Area Cultivated by Olive Groves
As discussed before, expansion in the area cultivated by olive groves
can take place in land unsuitable for the cultivation of other agricultural
products. This would be in hilly areas where the rough nature of land
would make it unsuitable for a commercial cultivation of any other type.
Nevertheless, this would require carrying out minimum land reclamation,
such as building retaining walls and reducing the rocky nature of land.
Table 21 shows the financial cash flow statement for a 20 dunum
project for land reclamation and cultivation. The project involves the
cultivation of land by olives and grape trees. Grape trees are often
cultivated between olive trees; a practice that does not harm olive trees
growth and increases land utilization. The cash flow shows a positive net
present value of 2211 Jordanian Dinars at a 10% discount rate. The
internal rate of return for the project is 15.4%. These values indicate
that such a project would be financially feasible.
TABLE 21
CASHFLOW STATEMENT: RECLAMATION AND CULTIVATION OF 20 DUNUMS OF LAND WITH OLIVE AND GRAPE TREES
(1981 JORDANIAN DINARS).....
Y.A. 1 2..5 6.7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
CASH OUTPLOW
FIXED COSTS 2,700
OPERATING COSTs 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 850
LOAN REPAYMENT. 107 107 107 107 107 107 556 527 500 475
TOTAL OUTPLOW . 3,657 957 957 957 957 957 1,406 1,377 1,350 1,325 850 850 850 850 850
TOTALINPLOW1,782 640 920 1200 1760 2,000 2,160 2,800 3,360 3,760 4,560 2,960 2,960
NET CASH PLOW (1,875) (957) (957). (317) (7) 2413412 8W 475 1~3O HO 2
NPV (i= 10%) 2,211
IRR 15.4%
SOURCE: Arab Fund, 1985, Dirasah Tahliliah Hawi Imkaniat Da'im Alqita Alzira'
Fi AI-Manatiq AI-Muhtalah An Tariq Al-itiman AI-Zira'i (A study of
Supporting the Agricultural Sector in the Occupied Territories by
Agricultural Credit), The Arab Fund for Economic and Social
Dcvelopment, Kuwait, p.26
* Loan s assumed to cover 66% of fixed cost.
The remaining 34% would be covered by the farmer
Increasing Profitability Through Higher Productivity and Lower Costs of
Production
The profitability of olive oil production is decreased by the use of
traditional cultivation. Conventional methods result in higher labor costs
and lower levels of production. What is required is higher productivity
of both land and labor.
The mechanization of the production process, and especially
cultivation, is seen as an inevitable process if higher productivity is
desired (Awartani, 1981, p. 28). The introduction of machinery rentals
would be suitable to minimize the cost of the process. Mechanization
should include ploughing, pruning, spraying, and transport.
Increasing productivity of land is also achieved through better
cultivation practices. Old olive groves comprise a large percentage of
groves in the West Bank. These require special pruning so as to arrive
at a higher productivity level. In addition, currently, almond trees are
largely cultivated in olive groves. This has a high adverse effect on
olive trees productivity. The replacement of almond trees by grape trees
is recommended.
Productivity of land could be increased greatly by the introduction of
fertilizers and pesticides. The introduction of such uses should be carried
out gradually and through agricultural societies or cooperative, so as to
introduce and inform the peasant on how and when to use these
chemicals.
Table 22 is a benefit analysis of the Increases in returns associated
with mechanization, in addition to fertilization and pest control measures.
The analysis is a rough estimation but is used here in an attempt to
FINANCIAL BENEFIT ANALYSIS PER DUNUM IN LOW AND HIGH YIELD SEASONS*
MECHANIZATION AND THE INTRODUCTION OF FERTILIZATION AND PEST CONTROL
(1981 JORDANIAN DINARS)
ITEM HIGH-YIELD LOW-YIELD....REMAR
LABOR COST SAVINGS...
PLOUGI-ING 5.50 5.50 Manual 2.2 dunums/day, mechanical 1 dunums/day.
PRUNING 0.77 0.7 Manual 0.5 dunums/day, mechanical 15 dunums/day.
PICKING -1.40 -0.40 Assuming the same method of picking.
PRODUCTIVITY INCREASES
. . ... .. ..... ..... .-.-- --- --.--.-- -- -- -.-- --- -.-- .--. .- - --
DISEASE PROTECTION 4.40 0.34 Increases produce by 10%
FERTILIZATION 7.61 1.17 Increases produce by 30%
TOTAL :::::.:.16.88 7.38
SOURCE: Hisham Awartani, 1981, Waqi Wa Mustaqbal Shajarat AI-Zaitoon Fi
Al-Daffah al-Garbieh (The Reality and Future of the Olive Tree in
the West Bank, Rural Reseach Center, Technical Publications Series,
No. 1, Nablus, West Bank: Al-Najah National University, p.17
Sumai'iah Nasser, 1980, Zaitoon Falastin Wa Mushkilatuh (Palestinian
Olive Oil and Its Problems), Office for Research and Documentation,s . . .. ..... ..... ....Ba.k: Biz i-nv ri  - 46
West Bank: Birzeit University,p. 37-46
* Calculations are done by the author
...........
quantify benefits associated with the above recommendations. A cost
analysis should be made for a decision based on a full feasibility study to
be made. This is not included in this study due to the inavailability of
data.
The analysis shows that an increase in returns of 16.88 and 7.38
Jordanian Dinars per dunum, for a good and a bad season respectively,
could be achieved if the above are introduced. Assuming a bad season
after every three good seasons, increases in returns would reach an
average of 14.5 Jordanian Dinars.
Expanding Local and Outside Markets
Until the 1967 war, West Bank products enjoyed unconditional access to
the Jordanian market. A substantial proportion of these products was
conveniently exported to neighboring Arab countries. The flow of
agricultural products from other countries into Jordan was selective and
did not impede the expansion of sectors with a positive growth potential,
such as citrus and vegetables.
Immediately after occupation, local markets were unconditionally opened
to Israeli production. The flow of Palestinian goods into Israel was
restricted. Palestinian agricultural exports to European markets were
channelled through Israel's export marketing organization Agrexo, which
represents Israeli interests (Benvenisti, 1987, p. 21). In addition, trade
with other neighboring Arab countries has been hampered. The Arab
League's Boycott Office has introduced several restrictions and
specifications concerning exports from the West Bank and Gaza Strip to
the Arab world.
Expanding outside markets incorporates essentially the relaxation of
restrictions on exports. For goods crossing the bridge to Jordan, this
objective should be pursued through negotiation with the Jordanian
government. Adequate basis for these talks would be that the
regulations governing produce crossing the bridge have not been revised
since 1976. Certain issues should be stressed, especially those
concerning the transport system. The limitation of the number of trucks
that are allowed to cross the borders to that operating prior to 1967
results in higher transport prices, in addition to limitations on the actual
quantities that could be transferred across the bridge to Jordan. In
addition, the concept of exporting 50% of the yield based on 1976 yields
should be revised. Furthermore, to be able to carry out an efficient
marketing process to other Arab countries, a West Bank marketing
presence in Jordan is essential.
In 1986, as a result of negotiations with the West Bank, the European
Economic Community (EEC) set policy guidelines that encourage marketing
of Palestinian produce independent of Agrexo, and special quotas have
been established, on concessional terms. In considering the expansion in
outside markets, two points should be kept in mind. First, fulfilling the
needs of the local market should be the first priority of any development
policy. Cutting the links with the Israeli economy is a political, as well
as an economic, necessity. Therefore, decisions on expanding exports
should be made within this development strategy framework. For the
case of olive oil, expansion in exports, as discussed earlier, does not
contradict the above policy. Second, adequate terms of trade should be
emphasized. In the case of olive-oil exports, maintaining a certain price
level is important. This could be partly achieved by introducing quality
control measures. In addition, the introduction of better marketing
measures would be necessary. This includes packaging in consumer-size
packs, in addition to carrying out market research.
In considering local market expansion, emphasis should be put on
encouraging local product consumption. In fact, substitution of imports
consumption is one of the main goals of the current Palestinian uprising.
It has been successful in advancing major changes in the consumption
patterns of the Palestinians in the West Bank.
Better marketing is directly associated with the quality of olive oil
produced. To give an incentive for the production of better quality oil,
classification of West Bank's pure virgin oil should be made. Criteria for
purity and classification according to quality has to be followed. Without
making a classification and enforcing it, West Bank olive oil cannot
compete against imports of refined olive oil and the imported less
expensive oils of vegetable crops. It requires very little effort for West
Bank farmers to improve the quality of their oil. Better quality could be
achieved by better harvesting, storage, pressing, and packaging
practices (Assaf et al, 1983, pp. 10-11).
Providing Agricultural Credit
Sources of agricultural finance prior to occupation were differentiated
into a number of institutions, each with specific terms of reference.
Medium- and long-term credit was handled by the Agricultural Credit
Corporation (ACC), and seasonal loans were advanced by the Jordan
Center Co-operative Union (JCCU). Other sources included marketing
middlemen and dealers in farm supplies, who often gave loans in kind,
mostly for seasonal purposes. Commercial banks were also an important
source of credit.
After occupation, all lending institutions, official and commercial, were
forced to close their branches in the Occupied territories. Up to the
early 1970s, most capital outlay in agriculture had to be covered from
farmers' savings, or through repayment facilities offered by suppliers of
production requisites and marketing middlemen.
The capital market, however, tightened considerably in the late 1970s
as Israel moved deeper into recession and inflation. Private lenders cut
down drastically on their credit operations, for fear of losses as a result
of the rapid devaluation of the Israeli currency. In addition, restrictions
were imposed on the flow of funds from outside sources. The scarcity of
finance, therefore, has become one of the most important causes of the
rapid decline in agriculture (Awartani, 1988, pp. 150-151).
In 1986, the military authorities allowed the reopening of the Cairo-
Amman Bank branch in the West Bank. Nevertheless, their services are
restricted by the military authorities orders and the Jordanian
development interests in the West Bank.
The establishment of a local lending institution would be, under the
current political conditions, the only solution for an independent economic
growth. Nevertheless, even if a credit institution is established, Private
Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) can still render useful services to
farmers in the West Bank. Some major PVOs have recently realigned
their policies towards the support of agricultural projects. 15 It is hoped
that PVOs will allocate more of their resources to development projects
which are of a public and infrastructural nature. In the meantime, PVOs
should be more sensitive than at present to the volatile political
environment in the area. This could be done by better co-ordination
among themselves and more effective communication with local experts.
CONCLUSIONS
This research is primarily concerned with prospects of development
under conditions of occupation. The political future of the West Bank is
undetermined. The current situation of military occupation might persist
for several years to come. Therefore, development studies taking the
current conditions into consideration are necessary. Even with the
prospects of an independent state, the current development efforts are
essential for the economic viability of an independent state. In addition,
the current political struggle of the Palestinians would be greatly
strengthened by an independent economic structure.
The role of the olive oil industry in economic growth under the
present political conditions is significant. It is an already established
industry in which primary investment has been already made. It is an
important source of income and surplus for the West Bank economy.
Nevertheless, under an independent Palestinian state, the role of the
industry would change. Investment in other production processes would
be less constrained. Diversification of production would be essential to
i An interview with the director of the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) in Jerusalem.
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propel economic growth. In other words, whereas the olive oil industry
plays an important role under the current political conditions, its role
might be less important and shifts in resources might have to occur for a
better economic performance.
To build upon this study, and to arrive at a more rigorous analysis,
further research is required. The prospects for the development of
other production processes should be taken into consideration. An
example would be the growing vegetable and fruit processing industry in
the West Bank. In the Jordan valley, citrus cultivation is expanding.
Accordingly, olive oil industry development should be studied in terms of
opportunity cost and in relation to other agro-industries.
Moreover, the prospects of olive oil marketing in the international
market should be investigated. The potential role of the olive oil
industry in the overall economic growth would be better understood
through a comparative study with countries of similar geographic,
demographic, and economic nature, where heavy emphasis is put on olive
oil production. This would be particularly important in studying economic
growth of a prospective independent Palestinian state.
Whereas this study has primarily Identified general bottlenecks facing
the development of the olive oil industry and has put forth general
recommendations, research efforts should be then directed to further
investigation of these areas. The aim of this study is to survey the
general restraints on economic development; detailed policy
recommendations should follow after more detailed analyses of these
restraints.
Finally, the political dimension of the whole process is important. The
extent to which the recommendations presented could be realized under
conditions of occupation is uncertain. Nevertheless, the West Bank,
through the many years of political struggle and occupation, has managed
to develop its own political entity, to get around the occupation's
restrictions and prohibitions, and to function under conditions of
uncertainty. In other words, Palestinians in the West Bank, with their
continuous efforts to counteract the occupations policies, are capable of,
even if partially, implementing policies and projects that they consider
important in the support of their political struggle.
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